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ABSTRACT
This study aims to examine the relationship between the choice of debt sources and firm
performance. The financial data for the sample of 100 companies that are listed on the
Russian stock exchanges was manually gathered and examined for the period from the
1st of January of 2004 until the 31st of December 2007. Cross-sectional analysis of the
gathered data showed that debt structure affects firm value. Thus firms with public debt
perform better than firms with private debt based on the market measure of performance
– Tobin’s q. Additional analysis showed that firms with previous public history
outperform those that initially make public offerings and those which rely on private
debt, while another finding suggests that firms with initial public debt offerings
experiencing higher return on equity. Finally, the estimation of the effect of switching
from private bank loans to publicly placed debt reveled that after such substitution firms
became much more leveraged and showed sustainable growth. However, based on the
market measure of performance there appeared to be that these companies experienced a
decline in their performance.
KEYWORDS: Public debt; Private debt; Firm performance; Capital structure
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71. INTRODUCTION
Attracting additional sources of financing is often necessary procedure for any
developing business. Frequently, hard conditions of high competitive market make
owners and managers count not only on internal cash flows and own funds but also on
external financing. With use of borrowed capital the capacity of economic activity
significantly broadens providing more effective use of own capital and as the result
increase firm’s market value. Of course, in perfect market conditions any capital
structure should not influence firm’s activity and its profitability (Modigliani and Miller
1958). However, in real market conditions corporations are often facing with different
risks and imperfections which make the problem of forms and sources of financing of
current importance.
There are three primary sources of debt financing for commercial firms: banks, non-
banking private lenders and public debt offerings. Among most popular and accessible
sources of financing are bank loans. Banks acquire sources from public and provide
them to businesses including so called “mark-up” into the price of a loan and
additionally requiring monitoring procedures and securitization or in other words
collateral (Brealey, Myers 2003: 866-869). Many corporations are using such source in
its activity and believe that just bank loans present optimal way of obtaining external
financing. However, as banks are just providers of public investors’ funds, the logical
question arises: “why not to go directly to public for the debt?”
As international experience indicates, important role in corporations’ capital structure
starts to play issuance of debt securities. Debt security is a financial instrument stating
the commitment of a borrower to return obtained funds from a lender in specified
circumstances (Vernimmen et. al.: 2005: 485). This method of obtaining extra finances
allows operating directly on the public market, communicating with investors in a
straight line. The main advantage of bonds in contrast with general stock issues is in its
possibility not to redistribute the ownership of a company but to accumulate additional
funds from public. During the last decades the share of bonds took more than a half
from all securities’ issuance in the developed countries, which indicates the importance
of corporate bonds as an alternative source of financing.
8In fact not only huge corporations but small and medium businesses are resorting
external public debt financing. During the last decades more and more entities are
relying on public debt. There could be several reasons for that and all of them are
different for each firm in each country but the fact is that debt financing became major
source of external funds remains indisputable.
Table 1. Debt fraction in corporate capital structures in developed countries (Booth,
Aivazian, Demirguc-Kurt and Maksimovic 2001).
Country Time period Total debtratio (%)
Long-Term
book debt ratio
(%)
Long-Term
market debt
ratio (%)
Germany 1991 73 38 23
France 1991 71 48 41
Italy 1991 70 47 46
Japan 1991 69 53 29
U.S. 1991 58 37 28
Canada 1991 56 39 35
U.K. 1991 54 28 19
As table 1 indicates the total debt ratio in corporations’ capital structures is at least more
than a half in developed countries. Thus the understanding of the role of different
sources of debt appears to be extremely important issues in modern corporate finance.
But as forms and ways of obtaining external finances are well known and widely used
by corporations, the effect of its use remains somewhat uncertain. Many studies were
aimed to reveal some correlations between capital structure, especially the use of debt
financing and firm’s performance. For example, some studies showed that there is a
relationship between firm’s capital structure and its investment spending as well as
competitive behavior on the product markets (Rotemberg and Scharfstein 1990;
Kovenock and Phillips 1997; Maksimovic 1990). As had been revealed by mentioned
researches, debt capital significantly changes the structure of motivation of management
and shareholders. Like that, it was argued that on imperfect markets debt financing and
investments can give corporations strategic advantage among competitors. More
formally, increase in investments can reduce marginal costs of production (see e.g.
9Cortazar, Schwartz, Löwener 1998) and at the same time debt commitment can increase
investment opportunities and vice versa. Thus, increase in debt financing can lead to an
enlargement of production level, decreasing marginal costs and by these provide
advantage among competitors. Such advantage can also be obtained by guaranteed long-
term debt rather than short-term loans (Clayton 1999).
In middle 80’s several financial economists argued that corporations may obtain some
advantages from increased debt financing in oligopoly environment (Brander and Lewis
1986; Maksimovic 1988). In particular there is an opinion that increase of debt in firm’s
capital structure leads to more aggressive production strategies. Such behavior of a firm
after increased debt financing is also known as limited liability effect, first discussed by
Brander and Lewis (1986). In their work they argue that increased level of riskiness
with higher level of debt can be transformed from owners and managers to creditors. In
other words managers have liabilities that limited only by their compensation (salary)
and shareholders are risking only by made investments. Higher level of debt in
company’s capital structure motivates shareholders to increase volume of production
since in case of bankruptcy they will lose their investments, however in case of full debt
repayment they will obtain full rights on all assets. As the result, shareholders are
motivated to more aggressive behavior on market and increase the volume of
production, which lead to bigger share of market on oligopoly environment and of
course higher profits.
As one standpoint described in economic literature states that increased level of debt
leads to more aggressive behavior and bigger market share, another economists argue
absolutely opposite. For example, Opler and Titman (1994) found that in industry
slowdowns high-leveraged companies lose their market share more, in contrast with
those firms that are conservatively financed. Here main argument is that companies
experiencing financial difficulties during slowdown of its industry start to sell assets
and close investment projects, by what decreasing potential volume of production and
as the result losing its market share. Such findings were obtained empirically and are
hard to call in question.
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Somewhat similar problem was also described earlier by Myers (1977) in form of “debt
overhang effect”. He argued that significant increase in debt may increase the possibility
of bankruptcy as well. In that case shareholders may lose investments made and hard
debt financing may discourage them from further investments into production and
marketing. As the result harder debt usage leads to decrease of investments into
business development. In such situation there is also possibility for so called “effect of
strategic bankruptcy”. Since increased financial vulnerability may push competitors
toward predatory pricing. Competitors may reduce prices hoping that high-leveraged
company will suffer from higher loses and go bankrupt.
All mentioned studies were aimed on estimation of the role of debt financing in firm’s
performance and in general it can be stated that this role is significant. Either it can lead
to significant growth and increase in value or down to bankruptcy. That is why the role
of debt has to be learned more and that is what determines the frame of this work. An
attempt to distinguish between debt forms was made in order to obtain an understanding
of how different sources of debt can influence firm’s performance and its value.
1.1 Purpose of the study
This paper raises the question whether the choice between public and private debt has
any implications for firm performance. In particular two goals are pursued:
- To examine the influence of different debt sources on firm performance and
- To estimate the effect of switching from private bank loans to publicly traded
bonds.
Present  study  tries  to  find  the  answer  for  the  problem  of  what  kind  of  debt  source  is
influencing firm performance more and under what circumstances what are the benefits
from the different debt sources.
The unique data manually gathered by the author from the Russian market makes this
research exclusive and significantly adds to the scientific knowledge in the area. To the
awareness of the author there were absolutely no similar researches on the Russian
market, which makes this work a provider of unique empirical observations for the
11
academic community. Sample of the empirical testing consists of one hundred
corporations among of which 50 are relying on private debt financing – bank loans and
50 – on the public debt. Financial institutions, insurance companies and investment
funds were excluded from the sample due to specific structures of capital. The period of
estimations is four years, starting from the 1st of January of 2004 until 31st of December
of 2007, which makes this study one of the latest on that topic. This period is also
characterized by fast economic growth in Russian economy and covers the environment
of vigorous business cycles.
Generally speaking, dividing the debt into private and public is basically comparing
bank loans and publicly issued bonds. In this work under bank loans assumed all funds
provided by commercial banks to corporations, including leasing and credit lines. And
under issued bonds here is assumed a security that certifies loan relationships between
its owner (investor) and loan taker (issuer).
Primary performance measures are Tobin’s q and  return  on  assets  (ROA),  as  well  as
return on equity (ROE). Tobin’s q is estimated as the market value of total assets
divided by the replacement cost of assets. Such approach is frequently used in firm
value evaluation (see e.g. Yermack 1996; Anderson and Reeb 2003). ROA is calculated
as a net income divided by the book value of total assets and ROE is computed as net
income divided by total equity. Some control variables are also used and discussed in
more details in chapter five.
As long as main purpose is to reveal the relationship between firm performance and
different sources of debt financing, additional goal is to examine the particular effect of
switching from private to public debt. For that reason 25 corporations that switched
from bank loans to bonds during the sample period were chosen. After the switch main
performance ratios are compared so its effect could be revealed.
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1.2 Structure of the study
The paper is structured as follows: first the main conceptual theories of the capital
structure are presented for general examination of the topic. Theoretical framework
from previous studies is presented next in order to reveal basic concepts in the
examining issue. Further previous empirical evidences raise the discussion of coherence
of the findings from different markets, followed by empirical part of the paper and
conclusion.
The first chapter briefly describes the subject and its importance in the field. Providing
background information on the topic it aims to introduce the research problem. Short
description of data and scholarly approach to its examination is also provided in chapter
one. Chapter two explains main theories on the capital structure and their empirical tests
providing the general knowledge on the capital structure choice. The third chapter is
devoted to existing models and theories on the debt structure while chapter four presents
previous empirical examinations of those theories.
Data and methodology are described in chapter five in more details, while chapter six is
presenting empirical results obtained from conducted tests and observations. Chapter
seven concludes the paper suggesting some ideas for further research on discussed issue
and brief summary of the study is then presented.
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2. GENERAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES AND THEIR EMPIRICAL
TESTS
Optimal capital structure implies such combination of borrowed and own funds that will
maximize the market value of total capital (Brealey, Myers 2003: 477-478). The search
for such combination is a problem, the solution to which was attempted to be found by
many researchers and scientists. Thus theoretical models started to appear in economic
literature from the mid of the XX century. Literally the capital structure of corporation
was examined from the side of debt and equity mixture and huge part of financial
economic literature was devoted to the search of the best proportions of these two. As
the result different concepts, in basis of which lay controversial approaches to the debt-
equity choice optimization were developed. All of them represented by models that
aimed to maximize the value of a company by capital structure management. On its
behalf, optimization of the debt-equity combination is opening the road to the value
maximization of a company and thoughtful structuring of debt as separate can improve
the performance of a company and as the result positively contribute to the firm’s value
maximization.
The description of the main capital structure theories is presented in this chapter while
the last section suggests a summary of previous empirical studies aimed to check these
theories.
2.1 Traditional approach and MM’s propositions
Traditional approach was developed based on real practice and observations. The
foundation of the traditional point of view is laying in costs of capital sources. There
was generally agreed that cost of debt (rd) is lower than cost of equity (re) and therefore,
an increase in debt reliance can reduce the total cost of capital (r). However, the practice
shows that any increase of debt in firm’s capital structure also increase the level of
default risk and as basis of investments suggest for any given level of risk there is own
level of return (Bodie, Kane, Marcus 2001: 160-161). Hence as level of debt increases,
the risk of bankruptcy increases as well, requiring shareholders to expect higher level of
14
return canceling in part or totally the effect of usage of cheaper debt. Traditionalists
argue that there is an existence of the point where the combination of debt and equity is
minimizing the weighted average costs of capital (WACC) and consequently
maximizing the value of corporation. The illustration of this approach is presented on
the following graph. Here and further D is denominated as market value of debt and V –
market value of total capital.
Graph 1. Traditional approach to the capital structure.
According  to  this  model,  corporations  with  certain  amount  of  debt  (D*/V)  in  their
capital structure are valued higher than those that are not using debt. However, with
expansion of reliance on debt financing and as the result of increased risk, higher
requirements of return by shareholders cancel the effect of cheaper debt usage resulting
an increase in both costs of equity and costs of debt, which naturally leads to overall
increase in cost of capital (Vernimmen et. al.: 2005: 659).
Traditional approach based on costs of capital sources seemed to explain the problem of
debt-equity use unless Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (MM) (1958) published
their revolutionary work devoted to the capital structure problem. According to their
model different combinations of debt and equity should not affect the market value of a
company. In other words, there is no relationship between the cost of capital and firm’s
value and therefore there is no optimal capital structure as well as it is not possible to
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increase firm’s value by changing the mixture of debt and equity. Graphically MM’s
proposition 1 can be illustrated as on the graph 2.
Graph 2. Modigliani and Miller (1958) model of capital structure irrelevance.
Thus the value of levered firm should be exactly equivalent to the value of unlevered
firm all other being equal: VU =  VL and the value of assets and investment are
determined only by their values. The proof for such statement was obtained with the
help of arbitrage theory and claims that in case if the value of levered company is higher
than of unlevered, investors would sell part of their stocks of levered company and use
the proceeds to buy unlevered firms filling up the lack of financing with debt.
Simultaneous operations with stocks of levered and unlevered corporations according to
arbitrage theory would lead to price adjustment and at the end the prices of companies
would be on around the same level.
But  in  spite  of  all  coherences  in  MM’s  model  the  practice  shows  that  this  theory
remains  only  a  theory.  The  main  reason  for  that  is  in  the  assumptions  made  by  MM.
While developing the model, the conditions of perfect market were taken as a basis
resulting appearance of such assumptions as: absence of taxes, no transaction costs,
perfect information, managers’ complete representation of interests of shareholders,
stability of financial markets and its frictionless, absence of bankruptcy costs, and so on.
In addition MM’s model assumes that companies can issue only risk-free debt and
equity, while there is no difference between private and corporate debt financing.
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Obviously such conditions do not characterize the real world markets and the use of the
theory  on  practice  remains  unclaimed,  nevertheless  the  model  (Modigliani  and  Miller
1958) brought the new understanding of capital structure problem and opened the road
for further studies.
Trying to move toward real markets MM published their second study on capital
structure theme where corporate taxation was introduced. Indicating that the absence of
taxation in MM’s model was the most unrealistic assumption there was found that as
higher corporation’s reliance on debt financing, the higher firm’s market value
(Modigliani and Miller 1963). According to the correction, a company that is 100%
financed by borrowed capital, would maximize its value. Such statement determined by
the U.S. taxation system peculiarities where dividends should be paid from after-taxes
profits, while interest on borrowed capital is deductable from the tax base. Thus
financial leverage has negative relationship with cost of capital and positive relation to
firm’s value. Graph 3 illustrates MM’s model with corporate income taxes.
Graph 3. Modigliani and Miller (1963) model with corporate income taxes.
As sensible improvement in capital structure theory was achieved with the second
MM’s work, in fact a company with 100% of debt in its capital structure is rather
nonsense than a common practice. Moreover 100% of debt is even theoretically unreal
and here is the question more about the debt proportion maximization. All these indicate
that even with relaxation of one significant assumption as corporate taxation the theory
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cannot be applied in the real world. In fact not only corporations are enabled to pay
taxes  on  incomes  but  also  private  investors  –  holders  of  stocks  and  other  corporate
securities. Therefore, MM’s model with corporate income taxes considered as one sided
until Miller (1977) improved previous models incorporating taxation of private capital
holders.
According to Miller (1977) personal income taxes may affect investors’ behavior since
the actual decrease of profits take place. Hence for example taxes on dividends may
differ from capital appreciation taxes or income taxes for shareholders may be lower
than  for  bond  holders  (like  in  U.S.  tax  code).  In  case  if  taxes  on  dividends  (Ts)  and
taxes on interest (Td) are equal there would be no difference for investors to buy stocks
or bonds and companies would receive the same tax shield as there are no personal
taxes. But as soon as these two tax rates are different the value of capital would change.
In that case firm’s value has a positive relationship with tax rates however in case if
taxes on dividends are higher than taxes on interest the value would significantly
increase with any additional debt financing and vice versa. Graph 4 demonstrates all
three possible situations with different tax levels.
Graph 4. Miller (1977) model with corporate and personal income taxes.
Hence it is possible to make the following conclusions concerning MM’s models:
VU
VL if Ts < Td
VL without taxes
D
V
VL if Ts > Td
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· Without taxes the market value of a company does not depend on its capital
sources. Optimal capital structure does not exist.
· With  corporate  taxation  and  no  personal  taxes  or  with  personal  taxes  equal  to
corporate, the value of levered company is higher than the value of unlevered
firm for the quantity of tax shield. Optimal capital structure might be obtained
with 100% of debt.
· With personal taxes different from corporate, the value of a company increases
with any additional use of debt. Dependence of the value on tax levels is
presented on graph 4.
All three models provide a deep understanding of the capital structure problem however
they do not hold on the real markets. Thus MM’s theories do not take into account
agency costs or in other words the conflicts of interest between shareholders and
managers or between shareholders and creditors. As well as bankruptcy costs are
considered to be zero in perfect markets but on practice such assumption is too far away
from the reality. All these drawbacks of MM’s models motivated for the search of
another capital structure model that can be utilized on the real markets however, most of
the developed models are based on relaxation of some assumptions made by Modigliani
and  Miller.  It  appeared  that  many of  those  assumptions  do  not  significantly  affect  the
final results nevertheless some of them do. Hence for example introduction of
bankruptcy costs notably adjusted MM’s theory.
2.2 Trade-off theory
The model that adds bankruptcy costs to existing MM’s hypothesis with corporate taxes
was called the “trade-off” theory. It suggests that while a firm is increasing the debt
financing it benefits from the tax shield revealed by MM (1963) but such benefits can
be obtained only until the specific point after which any additional debt increases the
cost of capital by increased risk of financial distress and costs associated with it
(Brealey, Myers 2003: 497-498). Among the first who added to MM’s hypothesis other
costs were Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). They presented a model where tax benefits
and bankruptcy penalties are valued in a single period. As the result there was found
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that the value of a firm is increasing only until the costs associated with riskier activity
are lower than benefits obtained from the tax shield (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973). In
other words the optimal capital structure is achieved when marginal tax benefits are
equal to marginal bankruptcy costs. Graph 5 illustrates this point as D*.
Graph 5. Comparison of the MM’s tax case with the trade-off model.
As the graph above indicates the value of a firm is determined by a trade-off between
tax benefits and arising costs of financial distress from increasing debt reliance. In
contrast to MM’s model with taxation the trade-off theory states that the optimal capital
structure of a levered company cannot consist of 100% of debt however, it is also
agreed that the value of unlevered firm is lower than the value of a company with right
proportion of debt.
According to the trade-off theory the optimal capital structure can be achieved by slow
increase of debt financing. This will negatively relate to the cost of capital (WACC) that
will decrease with any increase of debt but there is not specific value of the debt ratio
but a range of values that provides managers with some freedom in financing choice.
Of  course  with  small  leverage  the  probability  of  financial  distress  is  low  and  with
heavier use of debt this probability increases however, there is one more aspect that can
significantly worsening pre-default situation of a high leveraged firm. It is connected to
the agency theory as a possible conflict of interests between managers/shareholders and
VL without taxes
VL with bancruptcy
costs
MM’s model with taxes
Decrease of value
due to bankruptcy
costs
VU
D
V
D*D1
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creditors. These agency costs are determined by the rejection of the idea of firm value
maximization by shareholders and pursuit of own interests during the pre-default
condition. Often such actions like for example higher dividends, change of accounting
methods, and financial reports corrections, new issues of debt securities are worsening
the situation and increasing losses of creditors (Brealey, Myers 2003: 503-505). These
actions are often taken by managers and shareholders and usually decrease firm’s value
even more but using financial and operational instruments they are able to redistribute
the loses in that way, so the biggest part would lay on creditors.
Thus it is possible to make several conclusions from the trade-off theory:
1. Presence of particular proportion of debt in firm’s capital structure is able to
increase its value;
2. Over-use of debt financing is decreasing firm value, negatively influencing
overall financial condition;
3. For each firm there is it own optimal proportion of debt in the capital structure
but it is assumed that companies within one industry have similar capital
structure due to overall similarity in the assets structure, level of risk, etc.
The trade-off theory provides deeper understanding of the factors that influence the
optimum  of  a  capital  structure  nevertheless,  this  theory  is  not  uniquely  capable  to
determine the optimal proportion of debt and equity due to some other external effects
that influence firm value in the real world. This is the reason of existence of other
alternative theories that are described below.
2.3 Signaling models based on asymmetric information and pecking order theory
In MM’s models there was assumed that firms and investors have the same information
and decisions are made based on symmetric information. This means that market is able
to obtain information about firm’s future cash flows, which making possible to estimate
correctly the value of its capital. Yet on practice it is easily to notice that the degree of
information possession between firms and investors is different. This can be easily
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proved by stock prices movements after announcements made by corporations.
Therefore, there can be stated that market prices do not present full information about
companies’ value due to firm’s monopoly on this information and managers are able to
send signals to the market through making financial decisions such as capital structure
choice or dividend policy. Hence such asymmetric information was taken into
consideration in developing signaling models.
One of the models based on asymmetric information was suggested by Myers and
Majluf (1984). They assumed that managers are acting only in interests of already
existing shareholders, in other words “old” equity holders. They also suggest that in
case if investors do not have full information about a company than financing good
positive NPV projects by issuing new equity would make these investments less
attractive for existing shareholders. At the same time other sources that are less
dependent on information asymmetry like debt would save project’s profitability and
attraction. More formally if a firm is expecting significant growth after taking a project
and thinks that current market price is undervalued than equity financing would imply
that profits and capital gains obtained from the undertaken project would have to be
divided between old and new shareholders. Such strategy is obviously unfavorable for
existing stockholders. In contrast if a company supposes that future profitability would
be lowered by higher costs associated with higher competition on the market and
current stock prices are representing current situation than financing new investment
project would be more reasonable with new equity issue, so the losses from capital
depreciation could be partly relayed on new shareholders. As much new equity could be
raised so many losses could be relayed on new equity holders.
Summing up it is possible to distinguish between two possible strategies of a capital
structure choice. First, if a company has a potential for a price appreciation it is
irrational to use new equity for financing means. Second, if there are no growth
perspectives new equity issues would maximize the value of capital. From the investors’
point  of  view  it  is  possible  to  notice  these  signaling  actions.  Especially  when  a  large
profitable corporation announces the new issue of stocks than this should inform
investors about probable future problems and financial difficulties of this company.
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Myers and Majluf’s (1984) model perfectly explains price declines after new equity
issues announcements.
Arguing with the trade-off theory Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that a company
should maintain some reserve of available borrowing power sources in order to use it
when the market value can be increased. Therefore, the optimal debt ratio would be
lower than stated in the trade-off theory. This point is marked as D1 on the graph 5. This
reveals potential inconsistency in the trade-off model in form of static approach. The
model does not consider future needs in financing and therefore could not be used as a
forecasting tool for the capital structure. In contrast hypotheses by Myers and Majluf
(1984) provide dynamic settings for asymmetric information, which often arises in the
future.
Based on the model of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller’s model with corporate and
personal taxes (1977), Myers (1984) formulates the distribution of financing sources in
hierarchy order that was called the “pecking order” theory. There he proves that
retained income is the most favorable source of financing among other sources. In case
if internal funds are not sufficient firm will issue debt securities followed by convertible
bonds and finishing this pyramid with new equity issues. According to Myers (1984)
optimistically tuned managers would issue bonds if there is a need of bigger funds than
internal  cash  flows  in  order  not  to  sell  undervalued  stocks.  But  at  the  same  time
pessimistic managers would also issue debt securities in order not to send bad signals to
the market. New equity issues would be as a last resort strategy.
The main advantage of the pecking order theory is in its possibility to explain why big
stable and profitable corporations do not issue debt as suggested by the trade-off theory.
Internally generated funds of those companies are sufficient and they are not needed in
other less preferred financing means. Previous empirical studies confirmed this
statement but on the other hand there are many studies that provide empirical arguments
for this or that capital structure theory. Thus the main dispute swing about the trade-off
and pecking order models as the most close to the real markets conditions capital
structure theories. Brief discussion of the most interesting empirical evidences on that
topic is presented in the following section.
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2.4 Empirical comparison of the capital structure theories
When there is more than one coherent and scientifically proved theory in the field,
empirical  tests  are  the  only  way  to  determine  the  most  reliable  model.  Trade-off  and
pecking order theories are contradicting with each other and suggest absolutely different
directions for the optimal capital structure choice for management. Many studies were
aimed to examine practical application of those models however only not a single one
provided incontrovertible evidences supporting one of the theories. Nevertheless, all
previous studies in the field are contributing to the understanding of the capital structure
formation in the real world conditions and therefore worth mentioning.
Hence among the studies that primarily support pecking order model is the work by
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). They examine 157 U.S. companies for the period of
1971 to 1989. The regression’s formula used is very simple defining change in the long-
term debt as dividend payments plus net capital expenditures plus net changes in
working capital and minus operating cash flows after interest and taxes. The pecking
order predicts that firms with positive financial deficit will more likely issue debt.
Empirical tests sustained this hypothesis. As appeared to be the pecking order theory
has more explanatory power for corporate financing decisions however the study
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999) could not reject the basis of the trade-off theory.
Finally, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that if there is a target optimal
capital structure, managers are not hurrying to form it.
Particularly to test the pecking order theory was aimed the study by Frank and Goyal
(2003). They used the same approach as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) but for the
much larger sample for the period of 1971 to 1998. The results showed that pecking
order model receives less support when the sample is bigger and declines over the time.
Moreover, there was found that small firms do not follow the pecking order, especially
post 1990. Such results occurred mainly for two reasons. First, most of the small firms
became publicly traded during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, tests of large companies
showed that they tend to prefer more equity than debt over time. All these weaken
pecking order implications but not necessarily completely reject it.
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On the other hand in spite of the main argument of the trade-off theory concerning the
optimal level of debt, determined as equivalence of marginal tax benefits and marginal
bankruptcy costs, the study by Graham (2000) reveals that large, liquid, and low risk
companies are very conservatively levered. Empirical tests showed that typical firm is
able to almost double its debt proportion until the marginal tax benefits will start to
decline. Moreover, in case of enlargement of debt reliance the firm would appreciate its
value to 7.3 percent (Graham 2000: 1903) which is extremely significant amount. Such
paradoxical interdependence appeared to be persistent but for those companies some
peculiarities in form of assets construction (more intangible assets) and substantial
growth opportunities were found. Nevertheless, as the sample data consists of 87,543
firm-year observations from the U.S. market for the period of 1973 to 1994 the findings
are more than reliable and empirically support the pecking order theory.
The same debt-size relation was found by Fama and French (2002) who collected the
data from the U.S. market for the large period of 1965 to 1999. The study revealed that
more profitable firms have less debt, which absolutely supports pecking order and
denies trade-off models of the capital structure. However, at the same time observed
large equity issues of the small growth companies denies the pecking order. Thus the
study (Fama and French 2002) rejected to reveal determinants of such results, whether
they are due to trade-off or pecking order, or some other factors.
The study by Rajan and Zingales (1995) was aimed to establish whether the capital
structure choice in different countries is similarly collated with factors influencing it in
the U.S. In order to reach this goal they used the data from the biggest economies
namely G7-countries for the period of 1987 to 1991. From thirty to seventy percent of
the companies listed in every country were examined and the following correlation
factors were defined: tangibility of assets, firm size, profitability, and market to book
ratio.
The findings confirmed that correlation between leverage and factors identified as
important  for  the  U.S.  firm  is  similar  across  examined  countries.  However  Rajan  and
Zaingales (1995) found uncertain evidence for size and leverage correlation for several
countries and moreover, negative correlation of profitability and debt/asset ratio was
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also observed. Interesting evidence was obtained from Germany where legal regulations
making liquidation very costly and presuming that firms should wary debt, there was
found that large firms have substantially less debt than small firms, suggesting that
trade-off theory does not apply there as well.
In a way continuation of the Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) research is the study by Wald
(1999). He examines the data from the same countries (G7) but uses more variables that
might correlate with leverage. Thus Wald (1999) additionally introduces riskiness and
growth opportunities as a factors correlated with capital structure. Mainly the results are
confirming those that were obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1995) however with few
features. Unexplainable positive correlation between riskiness and debt ratio was found
in Japan, United Kingdom and France. None of the capital structure theories can really
explain such dependence.
Finally, Brounen, Jong and Koedijk (2006) broaden the evidence in the field by
providing results from the survey of 313 CFOs from Germany, France, U.K. and
Netherlands instead of cross sectional regressions applied in the studies mentioned
above.  Briefly,  obtained  results  suggest  that  static  trade-off  model  receives  almost  no
support among European managers, however around 10% of the sample have strict
target debt ratio. As appeared financial flexibility is the most important factor affecting
the capital structure choice but is not driven by the pecking order.
Based  on  the  previous  empirical  studies  discussed  in  this  section  it  is  possible  to
conclude that none of the capital structure theories can be supported by 100% on
practice. Even though there are some features that are driven by the pecking order and
some by the trade-off model in general managers are making similar choices in capital
structure around the countries and do not definitely follow this or that theory. Thus the
general result may be concluded in the statement that both theories have strong
explanatory power like negative correlation between profitability and debt ratio for the
pecking order model and equity issues by small firms for the trade-off model but both of
them cannot provide unique determinants of the optimal capital structure in the real
markets conditions.
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A huge amount of studies are dedicated to the capital structure problem. Most of them
are focused on the problem of choosing between debt and equity financing and still
even more than 50 years after Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) theory of capital structure
indifference (Modigliani and Miller 1958) came out the understanding of that choice is
limited. In their work they argue that firm’s value does not depend on its proportions of
use of debt and equity and entirely determined by its future income. However, in real
imperfect world the capital structure does influence a firm’s performance and therefore
the proposed theory is relevant only for perfect market conditions. The question of how
much of debt should be used by an enterprise and what is the impact of that choice on
corporate performance partly remains unanswered. In any case if taking any positive
Net Present Value (NPV) project a corporation could not finance it by own means, it
goes to the debt market and here arises the problem of choosing the form of debt. This
question comparing to the problem of debt/equity choice received only a few
examinations and little empirical confirmations.
It appeared to be that there is no common opinion in the academic community in the
problem of selection between public and private debt and its influence on firm’s
performance. One side of financial economists argue that public debt has significant
advantage over private agreements, while others state that private debt contracts are
irreplaceable for commercial companies. Both of these views have the right to exist,
unless one of them will be denied by empirical evidences. But for more than 20 years
there were several tries to support or refute suggested theoretical models, however the
results appeared to be mixed and controversial. Thus it is worth to mention all available
theories on the issue of public and private debt selection.
It is possible to divide all available theoretical models on three parts: models that based
on information costs and monitoring incentives, models based on efficiency of
renegotiation and liquidation and models that discuss managers’ incentives while
choosing debt source. The remainder of this literature review is divided on subsections
where each of effect sides are discussed, following by summary of described models
and concluding with examination of previous attempts to empirically test these theories.
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3.1 Models based on monitoring function of banks and information asymmetries
Among the first  who raised the question of capital  structure after MM’s (1958) theory
from the point of view from debt sources selection were Leland and Pyle (1977). The
question raised in their study was an explanation of existence of financial intermediaries
and information asymmetry. During that time offered theories were not able to provide
reasonable explanation for existence of institutes that hold one class of securities and
sell the other types of securities, like deposit certificates and bank loans for example.
And clearly under no transaction costs such institutes are useless since entities can avoid
additional costs charged and borrow directly from public. Transaction costs on behalf
could explain financial intermediaries, but such explanation would not be sufficient in
many cases. The suggestion was made in the model (Leland and Pyle 1977), where
informational asymmetries act as a possible reason of intermediaries’ existence.
The information asymmetry raises two substantial problems while a firm tries to borrow
directly from investor. First, opening information about a company, a purchaser may be
able to open or resell such information without any benefits to a company. The second
problem in selling information is connected to its credibility. Investors are almost
helpless in indentifying whether the information is good or bad on fact, brining
constrains in price values of such information. All these leads to conclusion that made
Leland and Pyle (1977) that financial intermediaries perform as a third party through
which information can safely transfer. Therefore, authors argue that firms with high
degree  of  information  asymmetry  will  borrow  from  private  sources,  while  those  with
lower information asymmetry would prefer public debt placements.
Diamond (1984) develops a model where he examines the delegation of monitoring to
commercial banks. He argues that bank financing can be less expensive than borrowing
from the public market in terms of possible adverse selection and moral hazard that can
occur when going into public debt. Banks can mitigate these problems and provide
better, more efficient and less costly monitoring facilities than any other single lender.
Further Diamond (1991) publishes more extended model on the problem of debt source
choice. More formally, he provided a theory of bank loans demand and of the banking
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monitoring role. The key point in the model is the problem of interactions of borrowers’
reputation and monitoring. Main results are consisting of the finding of positive
relationship between both credit quality and growth opportunities and reliance on bank
debt. As suggested by the model, the highest quality firm will use public debt and
borrowers with middle credit ratings will more likely rely on bank debt. However, low
quality firms have nothing to lose if they reveal bad information to the market or
alternatively if they open bad news to the monitoring institutes such as banks. These
firms would probably choose public debt since the costs of bank monitoring outweigh
the benefits. The interesting implication of the Diamond’s theory is that if there is a
moral hazard occurrence, the new debt issuers would start from monitored borrowings,
in other words private debt, in order to graft their reputation and later would switch to
publicly placed debt. Achieved reputation could be value enhancing during the process
of going public and will be treated in predictions made by investors while estimating
future actions of a company without monitoring.
In contrast the study by Rajan (1992) presents owner-managed firm taking a project and
relying on either bank financing or arm’s-length lenders, in other words bonds. Here the
division between these two sources is made on short-term and long-term contracts as
well as in Diamond’s (1993) study and the public debt is assumed to be only long-term
loan. Rajan (1992) argues that lender in form of bank will control the borrower’s
decisions and will continue to support the project only if it has positive net present value
(NPV). In contrast, borrowing from public can solve the problem of control and
interference in decision making by banks. According to main finding of the paper, such
contract may increase the owner’s incentive to put more effort into the project than do
either short or long-term bank contracts.
One more interesting conclusion made in the paper (Rajan 1992) is about correlation of
the quality of a company and its choice between public and private debt. As argued, the
highest quality firm will issue only public debt, as well as low quality company will do,
while medium quality corporation will borrow from banks. Such distribution is based on
the statement that the possibility of being liquidated is higher for low quality company
and, therefore the costs of bank monitoring outweigh its benefits.
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Combining these two studies (Rajan 1992; Diamond 1993) described above, it is
possible to conclude that evident benefits from bank financing are rather ambiguous.
Monitoring and controlling have to be weighed against the possibility of alteration in
the management’s motivation or liquidation of the project. By using public debt in
firm’s capital structure, which is generally long-term, it is possible to prevent the bank’s
willingness to close the project as well as motivate management to put more effort
applied to the project.
Another sustainable theory was suggested by Sharpe (1990), where he also argues about
doubtful benefits from bank loans. According to his arguments, banks learn more about
their borrowers’ characteristics, resulting appearance of asymmetric information. Such
asymmetry potentially can create a monopoly power of banks. For example, in long
customer relationships between a company and a bank, the last may not to be motivated
to offer lower rents due to such monopoly power over borrower’s information.
However,  due  to  market  competition,  rents  should  be  lower  at  the  initial  period  or  in
other words for companies that just entered debt relationships with a bank. As the result,
low quality firms would employ a greater proportion of capital, which proposes
ineffective capital allocation. And at the same time, high quality corporations would pay
higher rents due to the informational capture by their banks. Competitive selection of
customers makes almost impossible for one bank to interest another bank’s good clients
without attracting undesirable ones as well.
The model (Sharpe 1990: 1071-1073) reveals these offsetting costs that may prevent
companies to borrow exclusively from banks. One possible solution of these costs might
be also found in diversification of debt sources by issuing public debt, for example.
In one more paper by Diamond (1993), the author develops a model of the selection
process of debt’s maturity. Comparing long-term and short-term debt contracts, the
investigation of its influence on the future firm’s performance is provided. As the model
describes three dates in time 0, 1, and 2, where long-term debt is issued on date 0 and
matures on date 2, and short-term debt is a single period, the author argues that
choosing between these contracts may affect the borrower’s future business and provide
more flexibility and safety if chosen right.
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In more detail, after signing any debt contract on competitive debt market, the lender is
interested in obtaining future income from that contract, which depends on future cash
flows of the borrower. In case of unfavorable conditions and insufficiency of cash
flows, the borrower cannot repay the debt in full and the lender unwilling to take losses
will take control over firm’s management or call the assets to be sold in order to cover
given debt. In other words, this means liquidation of the debt holder and the greater
proportion of short-term debt in corporation’s capital structure, the greater the
possibility of that scenario (Diamond 1993: 342).
The main arguments for such assessment are provided in Diamond’s model very
thoroughly. Summarizing it, when a firm undertakes short-term debt contract, let’s say
in period 0 and has to pay it back in period 1, as described above, the information on its
performance is limited only to one short period. Borrowers who receive very low
performance ratios are liquidated (Diamond 1993: 343). In contrast, when a corporation
signs long-term debt contract that last from period 0 until period 2, even when bad news
arrive, the possibility not to be liquidated is higher, since the total economic value of
financed project is higher without liquidation as there are still time for obtaining
additional sources, either by attracting other short-term debt, in other words refinancing
or improving project’s cash flows in future (Diamond 1993: 343). In case of existence
of only short-term debt in corporate capital structure such refinancing is almost
impossible and management is deprived of possibility of debt restructuring. Therefore,
the mix of long-term and short-term debt can improve corporation’s investment
decisions by limiting lenders to take actions of liquidation.
The issue of effective monitoring and consequently more effective decision making was
also raised by Rajan and Winton (1995). As they argue, loan contracts must be
structured to increase the lender’s motivation to monitor since better monitoring,
according to authors, provide effective decisions by banks while examining a loan
contract. Provided model develops characteristics of loan contracts that can improve
incentives to monitor. They are covenants and collateral. Banks are using less their
monitoring function in short-term contracts and as the result lead to extensive power of
lenders in terms of excessive liquidation. Covenants are constraining the lender and
ensure borrowers that the liquidation will take place only in case of violation of these
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covenants.  The  model  also  suggests  that  private  debt  in  terms  of  covenants  exceeds
public debt due to higher easiness of contractual negotiations between private lender
rather than public lender and borrower.
On behalf of collateral the model (Rajan and Winton 1995: 1135) suggests that its size
should positively correlate with the financial situation and possibility of financial
distress of a borrower. As the result, the paper adds to the existing literature that
proposes bank debt as a much safer instrument rather than public debt.
Another interesting approach to the problem of capital structuring was suggested by
Yosha (1995). He argued that high quality companies will use bilateral credit
agreements instead of going into public debt market. According to his model these high
quality and creditworthy firms are facing high costs of information disclosure and
therefore would prefer bank debt where such information is saved between bank and
borrower. Otherwise, small and medium sized risky entities have nothing to lose going
into public debt market, while the information they open to this market is not damaging
them.
Such interesting point of view is somewhat inconsistent with Diamond (1984, 1991),
where it is argued that big high quality firms would issue more public debt, while
middle quality firms would most probably use private debt. The argument is concluded
in that high quality companies may use their reputation while going into public markets,
however, the counterargument made by Yosha (1995) is that it is not the firms that are
rejected by capital markets but the capital markets are rejected by high quality
companies that are hesitant to reveal private information. However, recent research by
Denis and Mihov (2003) empirically tests the determinants of the choice among public,
bank, and non-bank private debt for a sample of 1, 560 debt financing observations.
Thus, there was found that the choice of debt source is mostly connected to the credit
history and credit quality of the borrower. The highest credit quality companies seems
to rely mostly on public debt, while the less quality or in other words the most riskier
firms are using non-bank private loans. At the same time, middle credit class
corporations borrow from banks. Such distribution is consistent with Diamond (1991)
where the reliance on bank borrowing depends on the firm’s credit quality.
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One of the recent simple economic models of financial markets and corporate capital
structure was suggested by Bolton and Freixas (2000). They hypothesized that while
issuing equity in order to raise capital firms face high costs associated not only with
organizational fees but also with informational dilution. Trying to reduce these costs
companies are issuing bonds or signing loan contracts with banks. In turn, bank loans
are more efficient in terms of flexibility during financial difficulties of a borrower,
however are more costly than bonds issues due to intermediation costs.
In their model (Bolton and Freixas 2000: 326-327) all firms are divided into three
segments:  (1)  small  young riskier  companies  that  are  either  unable  to  raise  capital  by
issuing equity or facing some constrains to do it; (2) medium quality firms that are able
to  borrow  from  banks;  and  (3)  mature  safest  firms  that  are  able  to  choose  between
source of financing either from banks or bonds issues or by equity placements. Such
segmentation is appropriate for most of the markets, however the absence of junk bonds
makes this equilibrium more appropriate for European market where only safest and
mature corporations issue public debt rather than for the U.S. capital market.
As the result, the choice in favor of bank debt would be done only in case of high
demand for flexibility in loan contracts. Such demand is most likely to be relevant for
small risky firms for whom the possibility of financial distress is higher.
3.2 Models based on efficiency of renegotiation and liquidation
Continuing research on the topic of tradeoffs between benefits from bank loans and
bonds the second side of influence arises. Thus efficiency of renegotiation and
liquidation under different debt contracts received attention from the academic
community. Berlin and Loyes (1988) for example presented a model of a firm’s choice
between these two sources of financing: loan contracts with monitoring by financial
intermediary and loan contracts with no monitoring - bonds. Using several
characteristics of a firm, such as credit ratings, financial condition, etc, economists
establish  a  function  of  these  parameters  in  order  to  examine  differences  between  two
alternatives available to a firm that chooses sources of finance.
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The results were different from previous studies and latter were argued by several
alternative theories. Nevertheless, Berlin and Loyes (1988) state that bond contracts
tend to be either too strict, constraining the management in taking good positive NPV
projects or too loyal, allowing managers to continue running negative profits projects.
From the other side, authors also argue that bank monitoring policies provide more
efficient liquidation strategies, however with additional costs. They state that firm’s
choice between too harsh bond contracts and costly delegated monitoring depends on a
company’s characteristics such as production technologies and information technology.
Suggested model, however, do not provide a clear answer on the question of optimal
source use.
The capital structure of financially distressed company was also examined by Gertner
and Scharfstein (1991). In their study they also state that publicly issued debt may
impose some problems and as the result lead to inefficient decisions during financial
difficulties. This problem according to authors can lead to underinvestment when bank
debt is senior or public debt is short-term. Similarly, the problem of overinvestment
may occur when bank debt is junior and public debt is long-term.
Significant contribution was made by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) in terms of
examining the possibility of renegotiation of debt terms under public contracts. Such
possibilities include the exchange of previously issued bonds on the new ones. As they
argue such offers can be used however, do not lead to efficient investment policies. So,
financial distress may result inefficient operating policies even if banks are perfectly
informed and renegotiation with public lenders is possible.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) developed a theoretical framework on the issue of
bank debt benefits. Their model suggests that banks have advantage over other lenders
in form of flexibility and easiness of renegotiation in case of financial distress. The
main argument for that is concluded in willingness of banks to develop long term
relationships with borrowers since they are themselves are long-term players on the debt
market. Therefore, under financial difficulties of a borrower banks provide better
decisions about future actions in a certain circumstances. Thus general point is that
publicly placed debt is unable to make such efficient decisions like banks and as the
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result will call for liquidation in case of impossibility to pay on its debt by a company,
while under privet loan contracts banks may decide to restructure the debt and provide
additional financial sources in order to support distressed firm. Following this logic
firms that are more exposed to financial distress are relying on banks debt even if the
interest rates are higher on those contracts, while more stable big companies will
borrow directly from public benefiting from lower rents.
3.3 Models based on managers’ incentives
Another motivation for usage of private debt was supplied by Stiglitz (1985). In his
paper he argues that in case if a company is not managed by its owners than managers
might not always follow interests of shareholders. Thus, commercial banks may
perform as a control function over capital usage. Public lenders are not able to provide
such control function due to interest constrains. As a matter of fact, they are interested
in the end of process when they will  receive all  interest  payments and borrowed sum.
From the other hand, managers that connected with bank loan contracts have to respond
to requirements and demands of their banks and as argued by the author, this may
assure shareholders from incorrect or improper actions of managers.
As Stiglitz (1985) was mainly aimed on the ownership differences and its affect on
firm’s performance, Besanko and Kanatas (1993) are considering in their study
entrepreneurs in general that are choosing sources for project financing. As the result,
they found a negative trend between the amount of external financing and managers’
incentives for improving their effort on the project. The main argument is that any
external financing reduces the overall payoff from a project and therefore, decreases
motivation for additional efforts from managers. However, with monitoring features
provided by bank loans, entrepreneurs’ effort increases and consequently improves the
project’s  probability  of  success.  Thus  this  study  also  adds  to  existent  literature  on  the
advantage of bank relationships.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) suggested a theory, which describes the influences of
debt structure on managerial performance. They focus on two main aspects: the
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determinants of the number of creditors and dependences of optimal capital structure on
firm characteristics such as credit quality etc.
First, they argue that an optimal debt contracts provide benefits of mitigating of
strategic default and reduce costs in case of liquidity default. According to Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996) debt structure affects the price at which creditors can sell collateral
in case of default. Thus if there are many creditors, each of whom is interested in profit
maximization, the buyer of collateralized assets would have to gather many of them in
order to agree on its price. Therefore, following a strategic default, managers would
have to pay more for their asset in order to prevent lenders from liquidating the asset
when there are many creditors than when there is only one. As the result, borrowing
from multiple creditors should prevent managers from strategic default because of lower
payoffs from it.
Finally, an optimal debt structure should stabilize two aspects: discouragement of
management from strategic defaults and costs decrease in case of unavoidable defaults.
The model (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996) suggests that lower credit quality firms will
borrow  from  a  single  creditor,  while  low-default  risk  companies  will  tend  to  go  into
debt with several creditors. The results could be interpreted as a selection process
between bank loans and bonds. Thus borrowing from a bank is more beneficial for
small, risky, unrated firms, while public debt is more attractive for large, good quality
companies.
3.4 Summary and comparison of obtained theories
As can be inferred from the discussion above all theories are different and as being
mentioned before have their right to exist. Trying to somehow summarize them it can be
stated that with few exceptions it is generally agreed that reliance on public debt is
positively related to firm’s size, growth opportunities, reputation, and monitoring costs.
On behalf of private debt one might argue that efficiency of renegotiations and
liquidation value are among the most important reasons for reliance on that kind of debt.
However, as theoretical models claim, managers’ incentives are also playing not the last
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role in debt source choice. Thus private debt and its monitoring can serve as additional
stimulation for managerial effort on project performance.
But as all these models are more or less clear they remain only theories with significant
assumptions that may not hold in real world. Therefore, empirical examination and
check  of  the  theories  play  significant  role  in  academic  society.  The  next  section
describes available empirical test of the problem of selection between public and private
debt.  It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  it  appeared  to  be  much less  empirical  studies  on  the
issue  than  theories.  This  makes  present  work  more  contributable  to  existing  scientific
knowledge.
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4. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES
The empirical studies are also dividable on counterarguments but in opposite to
theoretical framework they are separated on two blocks: confirming or denying the
benefits from the use of public debt and confirming/denying the benefits of private debt.
Table  two  presents  short  description  of  these  studies,  while  in  the  next  part  more
detailed discussion is suggested.
Table 2. Previous empirical evidences from the field.
Panel A: Pro Private Debt
Authors Market Argument and Findings
James (1987) U.S.
Significant positive excess return for announcements
of new bank loan contracts. Negative abnormal
return for announcements of bank debt repayment by
issuing public or private non-bank debt. Reason:
“maturity hypothesis”.
Blackwell &
Kidwell (1988) U.S.
During high volatility of interest rates private debt is
less costly and vice versa. Small risky firms would
have pay 132 basis points more on average in order
to sell their debt publicly.
Lummer &
McConnell (1989) U.S.
Loan revisions under bank contracts are value adding
to a firm.
Gilson, Kose &
Lang (1990) U.S.
Banks are better providers of private “workouts” in
case of financial distress.
Easterwood &
Kadapakkam
(1991)
U.S.
Private debt is more beneficial under information
asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Around 60%
of bank debt placements from all long-term debt
issues.
Peterson & Rajan
(1994) U.S.
Small firms face huge information asymmetry when
entering public debt market. The benefits are higher
from long bank relationships.
Krishnaswami,
Spindt &
Subramaniam
(1999)
U.S.
Public debt can prevent corporations to invest into
valuable projects. Positive relation between firm’s
growth opportunities and the use of private debt.
However, large corporations rely more on public debt
due to lower costs.
Cantillo & Wright
(2000) U.S.
Private debt is less damaging in case of financial
distress. Public debt is more advantageous for large,
stable companies. Once a company entered public
market for debt it will stay there whatever the
changes are.
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Table 2 (continued).
Panel B: Pro Public Debt
Authors Market Argument and Findings
Houston & James
(1996) U.S.
Banks create offsetting costs. Potential “hold-up”
problem.
Johnson (1997) U.S.
Public debt is more beneficial if firm experiencing
lower information asymmetry and costs from
monitoring. Appropriate mix of public and private
debt can resolve problems arrived from each source
of debt separately.
Gilson & Warner
(1998) U.S.
Public debt provides more financial flexibility.
“Flexibility/shareholder interest” hypothesis.
Weinstein & Yafeh
(1998) Japan
Bank debt users did not outperform their industry
peers that borrowed from other sources. Despite
banks provide better access to capital, it does not
improve borrower’s performance.
Arikawa (2008) Japan Public debt is better in opening the routes for growthopportunities.
4.1 Evidences in favor of private debt
Among other researches on the debt structure choice it is worth pointing out the study
by James (1987). In his work he empirically tested three possible debt contracts: bank
loans, private placements, and public straight issues. The main aim of the paper is to
practically examine if the bank loans provide any additional value to a borrower. In
other words, is there some kind of special service within the loans that is not available
from any other debt sources? Pursuing this aim, James (1987) compares stock price
responses to all three kinds of debt placements. From the period of 1974 to 1983 there
were selected 207 financing announcements, 80 of which are bank loan agreements, 37
announcements of private non-bank placements, and 90 observations of straight public
issues. Overall there are 300 companies that are randomly selected from NYSE and
AMEX-traded non-financial firms. For statistical accuracy bank loans are determined as
existing credits and new loan contracts, including credit lines, as well as extension of
existing  credit  lines.  Privately  placed  debt  is  characterized  as  debt  sold  for  cash  to  a
fixed number of creditors, more often to institutional investors.
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The regressions results showed a statistically significant positive abnormal return for
announcements of new bank loan contracts, whereas abnormal negative returns
appeared for private debt placements. In addition, negative statistically significant
abnormal return was found for the announcement of bank debt repayment by other
private non-bank loans or public debt placements. In his event study (James 1987) an
excess return for firms announcing bank loan agreement was about +2% over two-day
period event window. It has to be mentioned that the same positive abnormal return of
+0.89% was found in the study by Mikkelson and Partch (1986), which excluding the
possibility of statistical incorrectness or data incompetence.
The possible explanation for such differences in abnormal returns might be in suggested
maturity hypothesis (James 1987) concluded in the statement that since bank loans are
mostly short-term and public debt is usually long-term, managers may use these sources
to show firm’s expectations about the future cash flows and therefore prevent
undervaluation of a company. Thus placing a short-term debt (signing bank loan
contract), company assures stockholders in short maturity of cash inflows and vice
versa. However, this explanation was not supported by statistical tests made by James
(1987) revealing inconsistency of maturity hypothesis with practice. Another potential
explanation suggested by James (1987) is in banks’ special service supply such as
monitoring discussed for example by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984).
Nonetheless, further research is needed for identification of the effect of bank services
on firm’s market value.
Extended cost analysis between private and public debt issues was provided by
empirical tests in another study (Blackwell and Kidwell 1988). However, this research
is based primarily on bond market only, but comparing two ways of offerings: public
and private. In that sense it is very important research since it allows abstracting from
agency costs and monitoring policies occurring in bank financing. Privately placed
bonds are somewhat similar to bank loans if not taking into account characteristics
mentioned above. Such issues are placed among specific number of investors and closed
from secondary market fluctuations at the initial stage. The understanding of costs
differences between two methods of bonds placement is therefore crucial for the capital
structure policies of companies.
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Based on 293 observations from 202 companies for the period between June 1979 and
December 1983 obtained from Ebasco’s Analysis of Public Utility Financing for the
private issues and from Drexel Burnham Lambert’s Public Offerings of Corporate
Securities for the public placements, the analysis showed that a firm’s choice of market
type is mainly based on the level of transaction costs. Thus, the findings suggest that
during the high volatility of interest rates private sales of debt become less costly than
public. At the same time when interest rates are stable public offerings are less costly.
One more interesting result was obtained from the study (Blackwell and Kidwell 1988)
connected  to  small  risky  firms.  For  those  companies  there  was  found that  they  would
have pay of 132 basis points more on average in order to sell their debt publicly. Such
huge difference appears due to high agency and floatation costs for smaller firms
comparing to large corporations.
An extension of discussed paper by Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) was achieved several
years later, when observing 156 largest in terms of annual sales companies during the
period of 1980 to 1988 lead to additional findings on the issue (Easterwood and
Kadapakkam 1991). First, there was found that 60% of all long-term debt is placed
privately, however this number was decreasing during the 1980s. Possible explanation
of these movements is the decreasing costs and more loyal policy adjustments of public
issues that took place during the sample period. Furthermore, consistent with Diamond
(1991), researchers argued that middle size companies rely more on private debt than
larger firms. This distribution points on existence of information asymmetry and as
assumed by the authors is more critical determinant of the choice between public or
private placements of debt. The analysis, however, did not found any relationship
between the choice of private/public debt and leverage associated costs such as costs of
financial distress (Easterwood and Kadapakkam 1991).
Lummer and McConnell (1989) extend the research by James (1987) in a way that they
distinguished between new loan contract and renegotiation and extension of already
existing ones. For the empirical part the authors employ the same procedures as James
(1987). However, this time 728 announcements concerning loan agreements between
U.S. firms and any commercial bank are observed from the NYSE and AMEX-listed
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companies for the period of 1976 to 1986. Among those 728 announcements there were
371 of new loan agreements and 357 were about existing contracts.
The research’s results provide additional evidence for the effect of bank debt on a
company’s value. Thus it appeared that for announcements about new credit contracts
there is no reaction of stock prices, while for the news about revision of already existing
contracts there is a significant excess return of +1.24%. Such findings indicate that bank
loan review consists of valuable to capital market information and for favorable
contracts’ review there is a positive relation, while for termination of a contract or loan
reduction is meat by negative reactions of the market. Confirming these results there
was found that extremely positive stocks’ price reaction was for review of loan
contracts that were considered in trouble. All these indicate that decisions made by
banks are considered as signals to the capital market and transformed into firm’s value.
A subject of significant research is the understanding of the role of private and public
debt in case of business default described in section 2.2 in this work. Thus several
empirical studies were aimed to reveal the benefits from using bank loans or bonds.
Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990) were among the first who examined private debt from the
side of efficiency in case of a corporate financial distress. In their paper they empirically
tested 169 companies that experienced financial difficulties during 1978-1987. The
main goal was to reveal the incentives of those firms to choose between going
bankruptcy and possibility of renegotiation.
As  the  result  of  the  study,  about  a  half  of  all  companies  were  able  to  successfully
restructure their debt and avoid bankruptcy procedure. Such evidence can be explained
by a simple economic model. Since the borrowers and lenders have only two ways,
either claim for bankruptcy or attempt to renegotiate the terms of debt use, alternative
costs are starting to play major role. As argued in the paper, both shareholders and
lenders will benefit from private “workout” rather than starting the procedure of
bankruptcy. According to legal regulation this process is long and costly, so both sides
prefer to solve the problem without additional costs, which is possible in form of
renegotiation.
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Finally, the findings were confirmed by analysis of stock returns of the sample
companies. It suggests that the market react positively when debt is restructured
privately.  Therefore,  concluding the study of Gilson at  al.  (1990) it  can be said that in
case of financial distress, a higher proportion of bank debt in a company’s capital
structure allows to avoid bankruptcy by private renegotiation.
The potential benefits from the bank loans relations are described by Peterson and Rajan
(1994). In contrast with previous research, economists empirically tested small business
data from the U.S. The key point is that small firms are relying heavily on debt but face
information asymmetries while entering public markets due to their size and as a
consequence unwillingness of rating agencies to rate them, by which creating
uncertainties about trustworthiness for investors. Therefore, small companies are relying
on bank loans more and by this benefiting from establishing relationships with financial
institutions in form of funds availability. The study also provides evidence that such
relations are cheaper form of financing for the sample companies.
One more interesting study was conducted by Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam
(1999), which extends previous research by empirical tests of the determinants of a
firm’s debt structure. It significantly contributes to an understanding of a company’s
choice between private and public debt placements. Using a sample of 297 firms over
the period from 1987 until 1993, the authors examine the impact of costs, conflicts and
asymmetries on a firm’s debt placement structure.
Consistent with Myers (1977), Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) found
the positive relationship between firm’s growth opportunities and the use of private
debt,  confirming  that  “risky  debt”  can  prevent  corporations  to  invest  into  valuable
projects. However, there was also proved that larger corporations experience the scale
of economies in issuance costs of public debt, and therefore have lower proportions of
private debt in their capital structure. Nevertheless, over 60% from sample companies
place  their  debt  privately,  rather  than  publicly  and  this  fraction  remains  about  on  the
same level around the sample period.
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Although, the study did not support the hypothesis that private debt diminishes the
contracting costs comparing to public debt. But it is argued that firms that are subject to
a greater degree of information symmetry, relying more on bank or other financial
intermediation loans.
Recently, the theoretical model based on empirical tests on the determinants of lenders
choice was developed by Cantillo and Wright (2000). This study significantly adds to
the previous theoretical background since contains the empirical base for its proof. The
data for the empirical part was statistically tested and divided into two blocks: the older
set and the newer set. First block contains of 291 companies with annual financial data
from 1974 to 1992 and the second block consists of 5,554 companies that have at least
one year of financial data. Last block was established in order to input control variables
for  examining  if  there  are  important  differences  between young and  mature  firms.  All
data was obtained from COMPUSTAT, Moody’s manuals, and Compact Disclosure.
The main point in mentioned theory (Cantillo and Wright 2000) is that public and
private debt has their own advantages in different situations. As was supported by
empirical tests, the main advantage of private debt is in the possibility of less damaging
interventions by banks in case of financial distress. From the other hand, public debt is
more advantageous for companies that are less likely to default, otherwise have high
and stable cash flows, profitability, and low level of real interest rates.
Cantillo and Wright (2000) also proved that once a company entered the market for
public debt it will stay there even after slowdowns in its growth rates and fall in
financial performance comparing with the original entry circumstances.
4.2 Evidences in favor of public debt
In contrast to all results presented above, the panel B in the table 2 suggests the set of
studies that primarily argue for benefits from public debt usage. For example, Houston
and James (1996) published their research where they empirically examined the
importance of bank information monopolies in determining a firm’s reliance on bank
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debt. In order to do it, detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded
companies was collected. The sample was randomly gathered from New York Stock
Exchange  (NYSE),  American  Stock  Exchange  (AMEX),  and  National  Association  of
Securities Dealers (NASD) at three different points in time: 1980, 1985, and 1990. This
allowed researchers to compare companies’ reliance on bank debt in retrospective and
permitted to analyze the changes in debt structure over time.
Using standard statistical tests, several interesting findings were obtained. They
revealed that firm’s reliance on bank borrowing depend not only on its size and overall
leverage level, but also on the importance of growth opportunities, level of intangible
assets,  the  number  of  bank  relationships,  and  the  firm’s  ability  to  access  to  public
markets.
In particular, the findings suggest that banks create offsetting costs related to
information monopoly, or in other words “hold-up” problems even for the largest U.S.
corporations. The tests also showed that the reliance on bank debt is decreasing as the
size and overall leverage of a firm is increasing. This implies that banks primarily focus
on small companies and at the same time, the study reveals a negative statistically
significant relation between the reliance on bank debt and the importance of growth
opportunities. Such results support the hypothesis that potential hold-up problems limit
a firm’s trust to bank debt.
However, all those findings were obtained based on a single-bank relationship. But in
the sample there were corporations, which were using several commercial banks as a
debt source and this allowed discovering another, positive relation between firm’s
reliance on bank debt and the importance of growth opportunities with several banks
relationships. At the same time, it is logical that the same relation was found for
companies that had public debt and for those companies that used bank along with
public debt, this relation was not disturbed.
Finally, the research by Houston and James (1996) brought the evidence of reliance on
other private non-bank debt. As appeared, other private debt combined with general
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bank debt do not resolve hold-up problem, which indicates the uniqueness of bank debt
in corporate capital structure.
Generalizing the work (Houston and James 1996) several conclusions can be made.
First, consistent with Rajan’s (1992) and Diamond’s (1993) models, along with
different benefits, bank debt also creates offsetting costs that have to be taken into
account, while choosing the debt source. Second, an appropriate mix of public and
private debt can mitigate these problems and provide more flexibility for a company.
And finally, other non-bank private debt does not resolve hold-up problem as reliance
on several banks in debt relationships does.
A year later, Johnson (1997) published the work where he also tries to examine the
costs of bank financing and as Houston and James (1996) distinguishes between bank
debt and other private non-bank financing. Among the other findings, empirically
obtained from the sample of 847 U.S. companies, Johnson (1997) argues that firms are
relying more on public debt if they experience lower information asymmetry and
monitoring costs, as well as less likely to be financially distressed. Moreover, he finds
that around 73% of the companies from the sample are relying on at least two different
sources of debt financing. This implies that appropriate mix of public and private debt is
able to mitigate some problems arrived from each source of debt separately.
Another study was not published in scientific literature but definitely extends previous
literature and scientific knowledge on the topic and deserves to be described here in
details. Gilson and Warner (1998) raise the question about the effect of switching from
private bank loans to public junk bonds. The analysis is somewhat similar to the second
section of this research, where the effect of substituting bank financing with public debt
is examined. Nevertheless, the study by Gilson and Warner (1998) is different in several
aspects. First, their study is aimed to examine the effect from debt source reliance on the
stock  returns,  while  this  paper  is  aimed  to  estimate  the  effect  on  firm  performance.
Second, the sample data for bond issues is taken from the Securities Data Corporation
(SDC)  database,  while  this  work  is  aimed  on  the  Russian  market.  On  the  other  hand,
Gilson and Warner (1998) excluded from their sample issues that financed LBOs,
mergers, takeovers, and leveraged capitalizations as well as convertible junk bonds
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because basically that could be effective equity issues. The same exclusions were made
in this paper as well. The period of the sample observations was from January 1, 1980
until December 31, 1992 which comparatively larger than four years observations in the
present study.
Gilson and Warner (1998) start their analysis form stock market reaction to the
information containing the shift from private to public debt. Using a standard event
study methodology they found that statistically significant this reaction is negative for
the event window (-1; +1) and (0; +1), however, for the longer interval like (-100; +40)
there was no evidence of abnormal returns. Even though, they bring out two hypotheses
that can serve as an explanation of such market’s reaction. First, so called “reduced
monitoring hypothesis” is based on the argument that managers obtain more freedom to
take value-reducing actions after shift from bank debt. Thus, reduced monitoring by
banks has negative impact on firm’s performance. However, the second hypothesis the
“flexibility/shareholder interest” appeared to be more supported and dramatically
different  from  the  first  one.  The  concept  is  that  it  can  be  in  shareholders’  interest  to
withdraw from private debt if firms expect decline in profits and there are several
reasons for that. The decline in performance may rouse higher constrains for managers
from the bank side and moreover it will be more costly to restructure this debt.
Therefore, shareholders decide to restructure it now in order to return to growth side. Or
simply, it might be that defaulting on such debt is more costly.
The second hypothesis was supported more by the study’s findings. All firms were
experiencing profit declines just prior to bonds issue but none was financially
distressed. After debt restructure those firms were able to maintain financial stability
and growth opportunities, which positively influenced their future performance, while
the debt ratio remained unchanged. This strongly suggests that public debt provides
more financial flexibility and is the only factor that motivates managers to bank debt
pay downs in the sample. On the other hand, alternative explanations for such
restructure as, for example, managers’ desire to avoid bank monitoring did not have
enough evidence and was not supported by tests (Gilson and Warner 1998).
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The main aim to examine the effects of bank relationships on firm’s performance was
achieved in the study based on Japanese market (Weinstein and Yafeh 1998). According
to their study, better availability of capital provided by banks does not lead to higher
performance, profitability and growth. Large data of about 700 manufacturing firms for
the period 1977 to 1986 was collected in order to empirically test such hypothesis.
As appeared these companies that were primarily financed by banks did not have higher
profits comparing to their industry competitors that did relied on bank debt.
Furthermore, there were discovered that bank’s mitigated firms’ growth by conservative
investment policy. Even though, the sample companies benefited from production
techniques obtained from the capital availability, they did not outperform their industry
peers. The analysis showed that the share of capital was significantly higher for the
sample companies prior to 1980. This finding is consistent with the view that banks
were able to provide better access to capital. However, after policy adjustments and
liberalization of financial market in Japan in 1980 such difference in capital usage
disappeared.
One possible explanation of low profitability and growth of main banks clients might be
in the rents that charged by banks in exchange for their financial services. There was
found that these interest payments were higher than average payments on debt on the
market. These results point on the ability of banks to control their borrowers in terms of
taking high risk high profit projects and therefore can disturb them from growth
opportunities. Based on the results of the study, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that
on underdeveloped markets, such as Japanese during the sample period, bank debt
relationships may lead to a redistribution of profits obtained by borrowers from
industrial to financial sector of economy leaving the firms without sensible growth rates
and better performance.
One of the most recent researches in corporate financing problem was aimed to
investigate the choice between public and private debt by Japanese firms (Arikawa
2008). Using a data set for a sustainable period of time from 1980 until 2005, Arikawa
(2008) examines the factors that determine the demand for public and private debt on
the Japanese market.
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First, he takes a look on a general situation on bonds market and bank borrowings.
Dividing the sample on large (more than 1 mill yen in net worth) and small firms (less
than 1 mill yen in net worth), he imposes the bond to total assets ratio. Observations
showed that this ratio grew drastically in 1985 – 1990 for large corporations, from 5%
to  more  than  10%.  However,  for  small  firms  the  same  ratio  remained  almost  on  the
same level, less than 1% along whole analyzing period. It has to be mentioned that it
also grew from 0.27% to 0.80 during the last few years. These numbers point that public
debt is used mainly by large corporations in Japan.
Further on, the cross-sectional analysis by industries was run. It appeared that
borrowing from financial institutions is much higher for non-manufacturing firms than
for manufacture oriented ones. Concerning the level of bonds usage comparing to total
debt, there was found that large Japanese companies had around 25% in 1980s and more
than 40% starting from 1986 until 2005 in bonds to total borrowings ratio. At the same
time for small firms this ratio was only about 0.4% in 2005, suggesting again that public
source of debt is used only by large corporations in Japan. Moreover, there was also
found that for manufacturing firms the ratio of bonds to total debt is significantly
higher. Nevertheless, it was declining from 1990 until 2005 from 70% to less than 50%.
And as for non-manufacturing companies this ratio was growing from 35% in 1985 to
almost 40% in 2005.
Trying to explain all described above movements on the Japanese debt market, Arikawa
(2008) uses general statistical analysis and reveals the main determinants of firm’s
choice between public and private debt financing. As appeared to be, during the 1980s,
when the use of public debt increased rapidly, the growth opportunities were the main
factor influencing the firm’s decision to switch from bank debt to public. High growth
opportunities and low default risk are the main determinants of potential hold-up
problems associated with bank borrowings. In contrast, riskier and low growth
perspective companies continued to rely on bank debt.
As can be inferred from the discussion above the debt structure received a significant
attention in the academic community. However, different points of view create
inconsistencies in the modern approach to debt formation in corporate financing.
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Concluding this part it is worth mentioning the study by Graham and Harvey (2001)
that shows how managers make decisions about debt financing on practice. The main
goal of the study was to investigate recent trends in corporate finance topics, such as
capital budgeting, cost of capital, and capital structure in order to reassure and develop
existing theories in these fields.
As the result, different findings were obtained, both confirming previous theories and
unexpected. Thus, in the capital structure chapter there were found the most important
factors affecting debt police. They are financial flexibility and credit ratings, as well as
managements’ concern about earnings per share ratio and stock price appreciation in
case of debt issuance. At the same time, the survey provided little evidence that
management consider such questions as asymmetric information, transaction costs, and
taxes while choosing the debt source. However, according to the study (Graham and
Harvey  2001)  the  majority  of  respondents  choose  to  issue  debt  in  order  to  minimize
their weighted average cost of capital (WACC) or in order to fund projects or future
growth, but only if internal funds are insufficient.
Surprising evidence was also obtained from the point of credit ratings. As being argued,
firms  relying  more  on  short-term  debt  if  they  expect  the  improvement  in  their  credit
ratings (Flannery 1986), however, the survey revealed that short-term debt is not used
when rating improvement is expected. Nevertheless, credit ratings are playing one of the
most important roles in debt issuance decisions.
Finally, the research showed that more than 44% of the sample has strict target debt
ratios in their capital structures. All those results are trustworthy as were obtained from
approximately 4,440 firms sample, totaling 392 chief financial officers (CFO) based on
specific qualitative questions – survey (Graham and Harvey 2001).
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 Overview of the Russian capital market and banking sector
Current situation on the Russian capital market can be characterized as fast development
and enlargement. Today it is treated as one of the most attracting among other
developing capital markets in the world. For the first half of 2008 the capitalization of
the Russian stock market was 1.3 trillion U.S. dollars (Timofeev, Tregub, Shabunina,
Shubochkin 2008: 6). This number is comparable with for example OMX Nordic
Exchange where capitalization of equity market was 1.24 trillion U.S. dollars or with
Swiss Exchange with capitalization of 1.27 trillion U.S. dollars by the end of 2007. In
contrast on the London Stock Exchange the market capitalization was about 3.8 trillion
U.S. dollars in 2007 (World Federation of Exchanges 2007).
In spite of several problems Russian market for debt securities was growing
predominantly from the very beginning, however with substantial lag from the stock
market or from the market of government bonds. There were almost no corporate bonds
until 1999 and in opposite to other international debt securities markets Russian
corporate bonds started their development straight from the exchange markets. Graph 6
shows progressive dynamics of the number of issues and issuers of corporate debt
securities starting from the year of 2005. It demonstrates that the number of issuers of
corporate bonds on the Russian market was growing on average by 41% per year.
Approximately the same rate of growth (46%) was in the number of issues. Thus by the
end of 2006 and 2007 the number of bond issuers was 465 and 370 respectively
(Timofeev, Tregub, Shabunina, Shubochkin 2008: 13). Comparing to other capital
markets these numbers were 357 and 361 for the OMX Nordic Exchange, 410 and 435
for the Swiss Exchange and 1619 and 1633 for the London Stock Exchange (World
Federation of Exchanges 2007).
Such rapidly growing numbers indicate that the Russian market of debt securities is
experiencing substantial development. More and more commercial entities initiate the
process of public crediting substituting or adding to existing bank loan contracts. The
ratio of corporate bonds value and corporate credits to the Russian companies given out
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by banks is presented on the graph 7. As can be observed corporate bonds took more
than 50% in the debt financing structure. However, at the end of 2007 this ratio lowered
to about 40% (Russian National Association of securities market participants, NAUFOR
2008: 130).
Graph 6. The number of domestic corporate bonds issues and issuers.
Along with domestic bonds issues in national currency (rubles) Russian corporations
actively attract financing from international markets issuing their own Eurobonds.
Hence even if this part is not included into domestic market valuation, international
markets are playing a big role in providing external funds for the Russian corporations.
According to statistics the total amount of Eurobonds issues was around 300 for the
01.01.2008, the nominal value of which was 94,3 billion U.S. dollars (Russian National
Association of securities market participants, NAUFOR 2008: 17).
It also has to be mentioned that at the end of 2006 the Russian market for debt securities
was expanded by new perspective securities – mortgage-backed bonds, however this
part of the market currently developing slower than others tacking in account the
mortgage crisis in the U.S. and in some other developed countries.
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Graph 7. Ratio of corporate bonds in circulation and volume of long-term (longer than
1 year) bank loans to corporations (in millions of Russian rubles). (source: NAUFOR).
The Russian capital market is also presented by governmental, municipal, and Central
Bank bonds, as well as commercial papers, and investment shares. Derivatives markets
mainly presented by futures and options on stock prices and indices. The amount of
open futures and options on stock prices and indices was 2,5 million contracts at the end
of 2007 (Russian National Association of securities market participants, NAUFOR
2008: 19). The development of these parts of the market is coherent with main trends on
the Russian capital market.
In spite of all advantages nowadays the Russian capital market is still not significant
instrument of capital accumulation for population and not the primary source of
investments  for  majority  of  corporations.  Thus  it  can  be  described  as  at  the  very
beginning of its development. However the market in such condition becomes even
more interesting to examine because of possibility to observe the processes of financial
circulation in its formation.
The banking sector on the other hand is presented by 1 243 registered banks at the end
of 2008. This amount was significantly bigger prior 2003. Hence since 2003, 1 419
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bank licenses were annulled. In part this reduction in commercial banks quantity was
politics of the Central Bank of Russia (2008), according to which there is no need in so
many banks for the economy. Today, total registered capital of the banking system is
731,7 billion Russian rubles (RUR).
The crediting function of commercial banks was expanding extensively during the last
decades. Total credits grew from 2,5 trillion RUR in 2002 to almost 12 trillion RUR in
2007. This means that overall credit portfolio of the banking system was on average
almost doubling each year. As the result the most important value measurements of the
commercial  banks  were  growing  as  well.  Return  on  assets  (ROA) grew from 2,4% in
2001 to 3,25% in 2007, while return on equity (ROE) has grown from 19% to 27%
respectively (Central Bank of the Russian Federation 2008).
As well as in the capital market, the banking system has its problems. Among the most
important  and  destructive  ones  is  a  high  concentration  of  the  assets  within  top  banks
(around 45% of the system assets retained by the biggest 5 banks, following 20% held
by the next 6-20th banks). Loan concentration within one industry is becoming less
hardened but still counted as disadvantage. And finally, geographical concentration (the
Capital region) of sensible part of financial resources significantly slows down further
development of the system. All these problems are well understood by the Russian
authorities and establishing regulative policies are aimed to solve them.
5.2 Sample description and data collection procedure
In order to reach stated purpose of the study two blocks of data are required. First there
is a need for companies that relies more on public debt or in other words issued bonds
during the sample period. Second it is required to have companies that do not issue any
public debt and use only private bank loans. Both blocks of firms should be presented at
the stock exchange during the sample period. Thus the data for yearly stock quotations
and bonds issues that is available online was gathered from the two biggest Russian
stock exchanges: Russian Trading System Stock Exchange (RTS) and Moscow
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX).
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To construct the sample for the first block – companies with public debt, the search of
all  corporate  bonds  issues  was  conducted  for  the  period  from  the  1st of January 2004
until the 31st of December 2007. Totally there were registered 1258 issues, including
seven annulled. Further, all issues made by banks, non-banking financial organizations,
insurance companies and other financial institutions as well as public utilities were
excluded from the sample due to some complexities and inconsistencies and because
government regulations potentially affect firm performance in case of public utilities. In
particular, the incomparableness of debt-alike liabilities of financial firms and debt
issued by nonfinancial companies may cause inconsistencies in the analysis. Moreover,
governmental regulation of financial institutions such as minimum capital requirements
may straightforwardly affect capital structure and therefore lead to improper analysis’
outcome. As the result 619 issues by 417 companies left.
Further, for more coherent analysis straight adjustment for firm size was applied. Thus
the biggest (“blue chips”) and smallest companies were subtracted from the sample.
Other adjustments such as stock market presence requirement and financial data
availability were made and as the result 103 issues by 50 companies left. Table 3 briefly
describes this sample.
Table 3. Description of the bond issues sample.
Issues that were
aimed to replace
private debt
Issues for other
purposes Total
Number of issues 31 72 103
Number of issuing companies 25 25 50
- Paid down issues 8 19 27
- Issues in circulation 41 35 76
Average Maturity (years) 4.84 4.57 4.65
Average Face Value (billion rubles) 11.05 5.24 5.63
As can be inferred from the table above the number of issues that were aimed to repay
previous bank debt is much less than the number of issues for other purposes during the
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sample period. However the amount of firms is absolutely equivalent indicating that
some companies turned to the public debt market exclusively for bank loans
repayments. Average maturity of issued bonds is not significantly longer for firms that
repaid bank debt with obtained proceeds, 4.84 years against 4.57 years for bond issues
for other purposes. But an average face value is significantly higher for aimed issues,
11.05 against 5.24 billion rubles, while the average face value of all issues is 5.63
billion rubles.
The data for the second block – companies with private bank debt is the corresponding
number of firms with no public bonds issues that are traded on one of two biggest
Russian stock exchanges. The main requirement for these companies was the presence
of bank debt in their capital structure.
Further, accounting book values are required for performance evaluation. The
complexity of this part is concluded in the unavailability of such information at one
common place. Official sites of the stock exchanges suggest only limited financial data
of issuers but annual financial values are not available for the full sample during the
examining period. Thus the manual collection of financial reports and emission
prospectuses was conducted by the author of this paper in order to complete the
empirical part of the present study. In total one hundred companies were examined for
the period of 4 years.
Pursuing the second goal of this paper – to examine the effect of switching from private
to public debt, 25 companies were chosen from the sample of 50 firms with issued
bonds. The main requirement for those companies was the presence of defined aim in
the bonds emission prospectus as a “bank debt repayment”. Such repayments could be
partial or complete but not less than 50% of proceeds from the issue. Table 4 presents
main values extracted from the financial and annual reports averaged across the sample
period.
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Table 4. Overview of the basic extracted values for the data sample.
Column 1 introduces the overall values for the full sample of 100 companies calculated based on averages
across firms for each year and then averaging across sample years – 2004 – 2007. Column 2 and 3 present
average values for two blocks of data separately based on the same calculation techniques as in column 1.
Total
(1)
With Public
Debt
(2)
With Private
Debt
(3)
Number of companies 100 50 50
Division by industry:
       - manufacturing 52 22 30
       - other 48 28 20
Market Capitalization* 159.46 102.03 57.43
Total Assets* 112.60 74.37 38.23
Total Liabilities* 35.98 27.96 8.03
Equity* 77.39 46.42 30.97
Net Income* 15.07 10.46 4.61
* in billions rubles
As table 4 indicates the industry division between manufacturing and other companies
is almost equal. Companies that rely on public debt are presented by 22 manufacturing
firms and 28 firms from other industries, while for companies with private bank loans
these numbers are 30 and 20 correspondingly. But what is more interesting in the table
is that already based on the simple averages calculations it can be inferred that firms
with publicly placed debt are generally bigger and more profitable. Hence the average
total assets of the middle company with issued bonds are almost twice bigger than an
average firm with bank loan relationships has, while total liabilities are more than triple
higher. One more interesting detail is concerning the level of equity used in firm’s
capital structure. Equity is still higher for companies with public debt but the difference
here is not as big as for the level of assets and liabilities. Moreover in overall an average
firm with public debt is relying much less on equity than the company with private bank
loans relationships. Such interesting distribution is contradicting to the static pecking
order theory (Myers 1984) which claims that firms will rely on equity only as the last
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opportunity. An average firm from the second block of the data – firms with private
debt, seems to give priority to the equity financing however deeper analysis is obviously
required for making further conclusions.
5.3 Methodology
As the main aim of the study is to examine how the performance is influenced by
different debt sources, several performance measures are calculated. Return on assets
(ROA)  and  return  on  equity  (ROE)  are  the  primary  performance  measures  that
calculated from the accounting statements of the sample companies while Tobin’s q is a
primary market measure of firm performance. It is calculated as the market value of
total assets divided by the replacement costs of assets, ROA is calculated as net income
divided by the book value of total assets, and ROE is computed as net income divided
by total equity.
Some control variables are also introduced to check for firm characteristics such as size,
debt-to-equity ratio and simple debt ratios, and liquidity. Thus the firm size is
determined  as  natural  logarithm  of  the  book  value  of  total  assets.  The  amount  of
leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, while debt-to-equity
ratio is used to determine how much borrowed funds are used in comparison with
shareholders’ investments and calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total equity.
Market-to-book is determined as the ratio of market capitalization to total assets
however is used only in pair with ROA and ROE measures due to high correlation with
Tobin’s q. Liquidity is presented as cash means divided by short-term liabilities. Such
conservative measure checks the level of firm’s liquidity and shows how effective
financial means are distributed in a company. Hence if the level of the measure is more
than one than it can be stated that management does not effectively distribute cash
means that could be invested into valuable projects. Table 5 summarizes the sample
firms and provides overview of descriptive statistics of the full sample. The calculations
are made based on time-series averages for each firm separately during the sample
period and then averaging across companies.
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Table 5. Data description of the full sample (n=100).
Measure Mean Median StandardDeviation Max. Min.
Long-term debt/Total
assets 18.36% 13.13% 17.1% 112.47% 0.01%
Ln (total assets),
(in thousands rubles) 16.43 16.55 166.71% 20.87 12.72
Cash means/Short-term
debt 0.24 0.1 46.43% 3.66 0.001
Market-to-book ratio 1.46 1.01 148.3% 8.61 0.01
Debt-to-equity ratio 45.39% 26.44% 52.8% 267.21% 0.03%
ROA 8.68% 7.06% 9.27% 45.21% -8.08%
ROE 14.63% 12.95% 24.34% 148.75% -110.85%
Tobin’s q 1.88 1.44 142.74% 8.93 0.42
The empirical tests of the gathered data start from the simple means tests where
statistics is based on calculations of time-series averages for each company during the
sample period and then averaging across companies, while multivariate analysis
employs time-series regressions in order to recognize any relationship between different
debt sources reliance and firm performance. Hence the following regression equation is
aimed to fulfill the main purpose of the paper and determines if firm performance is
influenced by the methods of debt placements:
Firm Performance = β0 + β1 (Companies with Public Debt)
+ β2 (Control Variables) + β3 (Industry Parameter)
+ β4 (2005 – 2007 Year Dummy Variables) + ὲ
where:
Firm Performance is presented as ROA, ROE and Tobin’s q;
Companies with Public Debt are determined by binary variable that equals one when
there is public debt in firm’s capital structure and zero otherwise;
(1)
59
Control Variables as discussed before are firm characteristics such as size, debt-to-
equity and simple debt ratios, and liquidity;
Industry Parameter is a binary variable that equals one if the object is a manufacturing
firm and zero if a firm is in any other industry.
2005 – 2007 Year Dummy Variable is 1 for each year in the sample period.
Additionally the distinction is made between the companies that initially issue debt on
the public markets and those that making it already not for the first time. Thus
companies with initial public bond issues are denoted as one and zero if otherwise in the
time-series regression. Correspondingly firms with continuing public offerings are
marked as one in the binary system. The regression formula is taking the following view
in that case:
Firm Performance = β0 + β1 (Companies with initial public debt offerings)
+ β2 (Companies with continuing public debt offerings
+ β3 (Control Variables) + β4 (Industry Parameter)
+ β5 (2005 – 2007 Year Dummy Variables) + ὲ
To achieve the second purpose of this paper – to estimate the effect of switching from
private bank debt to public bonds two kinds of tests are introduced. First, average values
of performance ratios are calculated before the switch from private to public debt for
determined 25 companies, following the same procedure but after the switch. As the
result means test of 50 observations in total presents significance of influence of the
debt restructuring on firm performance. To accomplish this tests standard event study is
applied. Thus as company may have substituted its private bank debt with publicly
traded bonds in any time during the sample period (2004-2007), the event window takes
form of approximation of the time period before and after substitution. Literally
performance measures are calculated based on approximately two years before and two
years after the substitution announcement. More formally the event window is
[-2 years; + ≈ 2 years]. The sign “approximately” (≈) is used due to limits in financial
data availability. The last published financial report is available only for six months of
the year of 2008 and for companies that issued debt securities in 2007 the event window
(2)
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might be less than 2 year, however only a few issues do not completely fit the event
window and therefore the analysis results can still be reliable.
Second, time-series regression analysis is introduced in order to determine if the
performance of companies that changed private bank debt to public bonds is differ from
those that used proceeds from public debt issues for other purposes. The regression
equation for this analysis takes the following form:
Firm Performance = β0 + β1 (Companies that switched from private to public debt)
+ β2 (Control Variables) + β3 (Industry Parameter)
+ β4 (2005 – 2007 Year Dummy Variables) + ὲ
where:
Firm Performance is presented as ROA, ROE and Tobin’s q;
Companies that Switched from Private to Public Debt are determined by binary variable
that equals one if firm switched during the sample period and zero otherwise;
Control Variables as discussed before are firm characteristics such as size, debt-to-
equity and simple debt ratios, and liquidity;
Industry Parameter is a binary variable that equals one if the object is a manufacturing
firm and zero if a firm is in any other industry.
2005 – 2007 Year Dummy Variable is 1 for each year in the sample period.
Using the methods described above the paper tries to answer the question of what kind
of debt is influencing firm performance more and under what circumstances what are
the benefits from each debt source.
5.4 Hypotheses
According to the previous literature devoted to the capital structure problem and
especially to the debt source choice it is possible to conclude that different debt sources
affect differently overall firm performance. One argument is that private debt in form of
(3)
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bank loans is able to add value to a firm (see e.g. Lummer and McConnell 1989; Gilson
et al. 1990; Easterwood and Kadapakkam 1991). On the other hand others argue that
banks can create offsetting costs and cause hold-up problem (Houston and James 1996)
while public debt provides more financial flexibility and helps to increase growth rates
and as the result overall firm performance (see e.g. Gilson and Warner 1998; Arikawa
2008).
Following this previous findings, it is possible to formulate the main hypothesis of this
paper that is going to be tested. Therefore, the argument is that:
H1: The choice between private and public debt affects firm performance.
Further, concerning the second goal of the current study – to estimate the effect of
switching from private bank loans to publicly traded bonds previous studies suggest that
market reaction is generally negative (James 1987) implying that such market measure
of performance as Tobin’s q would be most probably lower for companies that used
proceed from the public issues to pay down bank loans than for those who used it for
other purposes. Therefore, following maturity hypothesis stated by James (1987) the
second argument of this paper can be formulated as:
H2: Substitution of bank loans with bonds has a negative effect on firm performance.
Next chapter provides empirical tests of these hypotheses and supplies additional results
obtained from the analysis.
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1 Means analysis of sample companies with public and private debt
Table 6 presents test of means of performance measures and control variables for two
blocks of data separately: companies with public debt and firms with private bank loan
contracts. In addition panel B provides correlation coefficients.
Table 6. Sample means tests and correlation coefficients.
Panel A in the table reports means and t-statistics for performance measures and control variables. The
means tests are based on time-series averages for each company during the sample period and then
averaging across corresponding block of the sample: companies with public or private debt. Panel B
presents correlation coefficients between performance measures and control variables. Coefficients are
based on simple averages for each firm (n = 100) in the sample during the sample period (2004-2007).
Basic performance measures are Tobin’s q, ROA and ROE. Tobin’s q is calculated as the market value of
total assets divided by the replacement costs of assets. ROA measured as net income divided by the book
value of total assets while ROE is calculated by dividing net income on the book value of total equity.
Firm size is determined as natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln (total assets)). The
amount of leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LT debt/Total assets), debt-
to-equity ratio is used to determine how much borrowed funds are used in comparison with shareholders’
investments and calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total equity. Market-to-book is determined
as the ratio of market capitalization to total assets. Liquidity is presented as cash means divided by short-
term liabilities (Cash/ ST debt).
Panel A
With Public Debt With Private Debt t-statistics
1 Number of firms 50 50
2 Long-term debt/Total assets 24.56% 12.16%    3.88 *
3 Debt-to-equity 64.15% 27.38%    3.42 *
4
Ln (total assets)
(in thousands rubles)
17.11 15.74    4.49 *
5 Market-to-book-ratio 1.61 1.30 1.04
6 Cash means/Short-term debt 27.11% 20.01% 0.76
7 ROA 8.35% 9.01% -0.36
8 ROE 13.12% 16.14% -0.62
9 Tobin's q 2.11 1.65     1.63 **
* - significant at 1% level
** - significant at 10% level
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Table 6. (continued)
Panel B
LT
debt/Tota
l assets
Ln (total
assets)
Cash/S
T debt
Debt-to-
equity ratio
ROA ROE
Tobin'
s q
LT debt/Total assets 1
Ln (total assets) 0.11 1
Cash/ST debt 0.04 -0.09 1
Debt-to-equity 0.59 0.10 0.06 1
ROA -0.03 0.29 -0.08 -0.23 1
ROE -0.15 0.18 -0.11 0.04 0.73 1
Tobin's q 0.10 -0.04 0.49 0.05 0.12 0.11 1
The results of means tests of equal samples of 50 companies from each block of data
show that there is a substantial difference in leverage ratios. Debt ratio determined as
long-term liabilities divided by total assets is twice bigger for companies with private
debt than for firms with bank loan contracts. Debt-to-equity ratio is also significantly
bigger for firms with public debt. The difference is significant at 99% confidence level
for both of these measures. Firm size determined as natural logarithm of total assets is
also  different  in  two  blocks  of  data.  As  row  4  in  table  5  indicates,  companies  with
public debt are generally larger than firms with private debt. Although the difference is
smaller than in leverage ratios, it is significant at 1% error level.
Slight  better  performers  according  to  means  tests  of  ROA  and  ROE  ratios  are
companies with private bank debt nevertheless no statistical significance was found at
conventional levels as well. However for market measure of performance – Tobin’s q
there is substantial difference in favor of companies with public debt and this difference
is significant but only at 10% level. Thus as row 8 in table 5 indicates firms with public
debt have on average market performance ratio at the level of 2.11, while companies
with private bank debt only at 1.65.
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Panel B in table 6 in addition provides information concerning correlation coefficients
of basic performance measures and some control variables. Presented coefficients are
calculated based on simple averages for each firm in data sample across the sample
period and characterize interdependencies of the chosen variables. Thus for example
debt-to-equity is naturally correlated more with debt ratio with coefficient of 0.59 but
the rate is not critically high for causing multicollinearity problem in the multivariate
analysis. Another interesting fact from the correlation panel is dependences of the
performance measures. In particular, the accounting measures of firm performance are
negatively correlated with debt ratio (-0.03 and -0.15 for ROA and ROE respectively)
and liquidity measure (-0.08 and -0.11 respectively), while the market firm performance
measure defined as Tobin’s q moves different direction and correlates significantly
positive with just mentioned control variables (0.1 and 0.49 for debt ratio and liquidity
indicator respectively). The same differences between basic performance measures and
control variable correlation are found for the firm size defined and natural logarithm of
total assets. Thus ROA and ROE have positive coefficients (0.29 and 0.18) while
Tobin’s q has small negative coefficient (-0.04).
But despite these different coefficients with control variables, all three performance
measures positively correlate with each other. Hence Tobin’s q has coefficients of 0.12
and  0.11  with  ROA  and  ROE  respectively,  while  ROA  and  ROE  have  significant
positive correlation at the level of 0.73.
The correlation matrix presented in the table 6 suggest that multivariate analysis would
more likely to produce different results for market measure of firm performance –
Tobin’s q and accounting measures of performance – ROA and ROE.
6.2 Multivariate analysis of the relationship between firm performance and public debt
reliance
The primary interest in the relationships between firm performance and reliance on the
public debt is examined by three time-series regressions where all three measures of
performance (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s q) are tested. The analysis also incorporates
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variables that identify initial public debt offerings and continuing presence on the public
debt market dividing each regression by two separate regressions. Table 7 presents
results using market measure of performance.
Table 7. Performance measure as Tobin’s q and reliance on public debt.
The table reports results of regressing firm performance (Tobin’s q) and reliance on public debt. Tobin’s
q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the replacement costs of assets. Firm with
public debt is binary variable that equals one when the public debt is present in firm’s capital structure.
Firm with initial public debt is marked one when the public debt offerings are for the first time for the
sample company. Firm with continuing public debt offerings equals one when firm had been issuing
public debt before. Firm size is determined as natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln (total
assets)). The amount of leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LT debt/Total
assets), debt-to-equity ratio is used to determine how much borrowed funds are used in comparison with
shareholders’ investments and calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total equity. Liquidity is
measured as cash means divided by short-term liabilities (Cash/ ST debt). Industry belongings equals one
when firm is manufacturing and zero otherwise. All regressions include year dummy variables. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Tobin's q
(1) (2)
Intercept 4.53*** 4.75***
(1.12) (1.15)
Firm with public debt 0.53**
(0.25)
Firm with initial public debt offerings 0.41
(0.29)
Firm with continuing public debt offerings 0.67**
(0.30)
LT debt / Total assets 1.44** 1.42**
(0.59) (0.59)
Ln (total assets) -0.22*** -0.24***
(0.07) (0.07)
Cash / ST debt 1.09*** 1.08***
(0.12) (0.12)
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry belongings -0.27 -0.24
(0.22) (0.22)
Adjusted R square 0.2006 0.1998
Number of observations 400 400
*, ** and *** denote coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Focusing on column 1 in table 7 the findings suggest that firms with public debt are
performing better than companies with private debt. The coefficient is positive and
significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that Tobin’s q in firm with publicly
placed debt is 28.19 percent higher than in company with bank loans. I calculate this as
the estimated coefficient divided by the average Tobin’s q for the full sample, which is
presented in the table 5. (0.53 / 1.88 = 0.2819).
Column 2 in table 7 differentiates between firms with initial and continuing public debt
offerings. In other words distinguishing between companies that joined public debt
market during the sample period and firms that were already presented on it before,
allow to estimate how the public recognition influences firm performance. The results
suggest that coefficient is positive and statistically significant for firms with continuing
public offerings meaning that firms with private debt and firms with initial public debt
offerings generally have lower Tobin’s q. The estimated coefficient for firms with initial
public debt offerings is not statistically significant.
Estimations in both regressions also show that Tobin’s q is positively related to the debt
ratio defined as long-term debt divided by the total assets as well as the liquidity ratio
presented as cash means divided by the short-term debt. In addition the negative relation
of the performance variable with the firm size estimated as the natural logarithm of total
assets is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients for debt-to-equity
ratio and industry belongings are negative but not statistically significant at the
conventional levels in both regressions. The time-series regression was explained on
around 20% in both cases by the presented variables and can be considered as reliable
enough.
The results from analysis of ROA and ROE as the performance measures are presented
in  tables  8  and  9.  In  the  regression  with  ROA  as  the  dependent  variable  the  only
statistically significant relation was found for the firm size. The coefficient is positive
but  the  adjusted  R  square  is  less  than  1%  and  therefore  significance  of  the  whole
regression is very low.
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Table 8. Performance measure (ROA) and reliance on public debt.
The table reports results of regressing firm performance (ROA) and reliance on public debt. ROA is
calculated as the net income divided by the book value of total assets. Firm with public debt is binary
variable that equals one when the public debt is present in firm’s capital structure. Firm with initial public
debt is marked one when the public debt offerings are for the first time for the sample company. Firm
with continuing public debt offerings equals one when firm had been issuing public debt before. Firm size
is determined as natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln (total assets)). The amount of
leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LT debt/Total assets), debt-to-equity
ratio is used to determine how much borrowed funds are used in comparison with shareholders’
investments and calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total equity. Market-to-book is determined
as the ratio of market capitalization to total assets. Liquidity is measured as cash means divided by short-
term liabilities (Cash/ ST debt). Industry belongings equals one when firm is manufacturing and zero
otherwise. All regressions include year dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Return on Assets
(1) (2)
Intercept -0.25** -0.24**
(0.11) (0.12)
Firm with public debt -0.01
(0.02)
Firm with initial public debt offerings -0.01
(0.03)
Firm with continuing public debt offerings -0.008
(0.03)
LT debt / Total assets -0.04 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Ln (total assets) 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.007) (0.007)
Cash / ST debt -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Market-to-book ratio 0.008 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Industry belongings 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Adjusted R square 0.008 0.006
Number of observations 400 400
*, ** and *** denote coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9. Performance measure (ROE) and reliance on public debt.
The table reports results of regressing firm performance (ROE) and reliance on public debt. ROE is
calculated as the net income divided by the book value of total equity. Firm with public debt is binary
variable that equals one when the public debt is present in firm’s capital structure. Firm with initial public
debt is marked one when the public debt offerings are for the first time for the sample company. Firm
with continuing public debt offerings equals one when firm had been issuing public debt before. Firm size
is determined as natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln (total assets)). The amount of
leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LT debt/Total assets), debt-to-equity
ratio is used to determine how much borrowed funds are used in comparison with shareholders’
investments and calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total equity. Market-to-book is determined
as the ratio of market capitalization to total assets. Liquidity is measured as cash means divided by short-
term liabilities (Cash/ ST debt). Industry belongings equals one when firm is manufacturing and zero
otherwise. All regressions include year dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Return on Equity
(1) (2)
Intercept 4.17 0.74
(12.29) (12.68)
Firm with public debt 3.93
(2.74)
Firm with initial public debt offerings 5.76*
(3.21)
Firm with continuing public debt offerings 1.89
(3.31)
LT debt / Total assets -9.68 -9.38
(6.37) (6.38)
Ln (total assets) -0.36 -0.13
(0.78) (0.80)
Cash / ST debt 0.08 0.11
(1.5) (1.5)
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.332*** 0.33***
(0.02) (0.017)
Market-to-book ratio -0.3 -0.27
(0.54) (0.54)
Industry belongings 2.27 1.93
(2.42) (2.44)
Adjusted R square 0.4942 0.4945
Number of observations 400 400
*, ** and *** denote coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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In contrast time-series regression with ROE as the dependent variable presented in table
9 is explained on almost 50% by the presented variables. Distinction between initial and
continuing public debt offerings is presented in column 2 and provide statistically
significant positive coefficient for firms with initial public debt offerings with ROE. In
other words companies that just entered the market for public debt are associated with
higher ROE. No other significant relation was found in both regressions except for debt-
to-equity ratio. This coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
The economic significance of this finding is concluded in the fact that return on equity
is generally greater for higher levered companies.
Summarizing results presented in tables 7 through 9 it is possible to conclude that firms
with public debt perform better than entities with private bank loans if the performance
is measured by Tobin’s q. Moreover, higher market measure of performance is
experienced by more liquid and higher leveraged companies. At the same time
interesting negative relation was found between Tobin’s q and  firm size  however  this
result is not necessarily inconsistent with previous research. Panel A in the table 6
indicate that firms with public debt are generally bigger, more liquid and higher
leveraged than those that use bank loans and therefore the negative relation with the
firm size in the multivariate analysis had been most probably caused by exogenous
factors like negative correlation between size variable and market measure of
performance.
The unique result was also obtained with Tobin’s q measure. The analysis showed that
firms with continuing public debt offerings perform better. To the knowledge of the
author no previous studies were aimed to examine this side of the research. Also there
was found that higher ROE is experienced by initially entered companies into the public
debt market.
In general obtained results considering applied control variables are consistent with
earlier research. In fact the findings in this part are significantly added to the previous
understanding of the relationship between sources of debt and firm performance. Next
section examines the effect of switching from one form of debt to another.
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6.3  Means analysis of sample companies that switched from private to public debt
Table 10 presents results of means tests of companies that switched from private to
public debt during the sample period. The means are calculated before the switch and
tested against those that are measured after the switch. In order to regulate the time
period when the measures are taken the standard event window is used which limits the
measures from – 2 years to ≈ + 2 years from the date of the issue announcement. The
sign “approximately” (≈) is used due to limits in financial data availability.
Table 10. Difference of means tests before and after the switch from private to public
debt.
This table reports means and t-statistics for performance measures and control variables. The means tests
are based on time-series averages for each company that switched from private to public debt during the
sample period and then averaging across corresponding status: before and after the switch. Basic
performance measures are Tobin’s q, ROA and ROE. Tobin’s q is calculated as the market value of total
assets divided by the replacement costs of assets. ROA measured as net income divided by the book value
of total assets while ROE is calculated by dividing net income on the book value of total equity. Firm size
is determined as natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln (total assets)). The amount of
leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LT debt/Total assets), debt-to-equity
ratio is used to determine how much borrowed funds are used in comparison with shareholders’
investments and calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total equity. Market-to-book is determined
as the ratio of market capitalization to total assets. Liquidity is presented as cash means divided by short-
term liabilities (Cash/ ST debt).
Before Switch After Switch t-statistics
1 Number of firms 25
2 LT debt/Total assets 26.11% 29.63% -1.80*
3 Debt-to-equity (LT debt/total equity) 154.68% 289.88% -1.41
4 Ln(total assets) (in thousands rubles) 16.84 17.34 -5.45*
5 Cash/ST debt 10.10% 10.16% -0.05
6 Market-to-book ratio 1.25 1.13 0.48
7 ROA 5.59% 6.24% -0.59
8 ROE 11.17% 2.80% 0.70
9 Tobin's q 1.79 1.71 0.35
* - significant at 10% level
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The analysis of means shows that after the switch from private to public debt companies
became more leveraged as well as bigger. Thus the firm size measured as natural
logarithm of total assets increased from 16.84 to 17.34 thousand rubles and the debt
ratio presented as the relation of long-term debt to total assets grew from 26.11% to
29.63%. These are the only variables means of which are differ at the conventional
significance levels. Tobin’s q and ROE are indicating a decline, while ROA increased
by a bit more than 1 percent but as mentioned before no statistical significance was
found  in  difference  of  means  of  these  performance  measures.  Overall  this  analysis
revealed that companies in general are able to sustain growth rates after the switch from
private to public debt and naturally become more leveraged as public market of debt is
associated with greater sums of loans.
As univariate analysis did not provide any significant evidence on the effect of
switching from private to public debt the multivariate analysis can be applied in order to
examine whether the firms that paid down bank loans with proceeds from public bonds
issues outperform those that did not switch and used proceeds for other purposes.
6.4  Multivariate analysis of the effect of switching from private bank debt to public
bonds on firm performance
Table 11 reports results from the time-series regressions using Tobin’s q,  ROA,  and
ROE as dependent variables. The economically significant result is that firms that used
the proceeds from public bonds issues have 32.7% lower Tobin’s q compared to those
that used the proceeds for other purposes. I calculate this as the estimated coefficient
divided by the average Tobin’s q for the sample companies with public debt, which is
presented in the table 6. (-0.69 / 2.11 = -0.327). Such significant amount suggests that
the effect of switching from private to public debt is generally negative in terms of
market measure of performance. Yet no significant results were obtained from ROA and
ROE regressions for the variable that indicates the switch.
With  respect  to  control  variables  the  significant  negative  relation  of  performance
measures as Tobin’s q and ROE to debt ratio was found (columns 1 and 3).
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Table 11. Performance measures and switch from private to public debt.
The table reports results of regressing firm performance measures and switch from private to public debt.
Tobin’s q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the replacement costs of assets. ROA
measured as net income divided by the book value of total assets while ROE is calculated by dividing net
income on the book value of total equity. Firm that switched from private to public debt is binary variable
that equals one when the switch took place during the sample period. Firm size is determined as natural
logarithm of the book value of total assets (Ln (total assets)). The amount of leverage is computed as the
ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LT debt/Total assets), debt-to-equity ratio is used to determine how
much borrowed funds are used in comparison with shareholders’ investments and calculated as long-term
liabilities divided by total equity. Market-to-book is determined as the ratio of market capitalization to
total assets. Liquidity is measured as cash means divided by short-term liabilities (Cash/ ST debt).
Industry belongings equals one when firm is manufacturing and zero otherwise. All regressions include
year dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Tobin's q
(1)
ROA
(2)
ROE
(3)
Intercept    14.51*** -0.3 40.42
(2.29) (0.28) (33.67)
Firm switched from private to public debt  -0.69* 0.01 -3.85
(0.36) (0.04) (5.00)
LT debt / Total assets  -2.55** -0.12   -28.85**
(1.06) (0.12) (14.68)
Ln (total assets)  -0.71*** 0.02 -1.98
(0.13) (0.01) (1.88)
Cash / ST debt   1.15*** -0.003 0.85
(0.16) (0.02) (2.51)
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.0006 0.0002    0.34***
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.02)
Market-to-book ratio - 0.004 -1.21
(0.008) (0.97)
Industry belongings -0.23 0.02 3.9
(0.36) (0.04) (4.91)
Adjusted R square 0.34 0.008 0.49
Number of observations 200 200 200
*, ** and *** denote coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Liquidity ratio in addition is positively associated with Tobin’s q while debt-to-equity is
positively related with ROE. The same negative relation of the firm size and Tobin’s q
was found in this analysis and is significant at 1 percent level. No other statistically
significant relation was found.
Summarizing this part  of the analysis it  is  possible to make several  conclusions.  First,
companies that switched from private to public debt by repaying bank loans with
proceeds from the bonds issue became more leveraged and were able to grow after the
switch. Second, switched firms experienced lower market measure of the performance.
Thus the entities that decided to change their private bank loan agreements to publicly
traded bonds have lower Tobin’s q on 32.7% comparing to those that used the proceeds
from bonds issues for other purposes. Finally, statistically significant negative relation
between performance measures (Tobin’s q and ROE) and the debt ratio confirm the
finding of lower performance of the switched from private to public debt companies
since the univariate analysis indicated significant increase in the leverage ratio.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Distinguishing between two sources of debt financing, private and public this study
aims  to  reveal  any  relationship  between  the  choice  of  the  debt  source  and  firm
performance. In order to reach stated goal the sample of 100 companies that are traded
on the Russian stock exchanges was chosen. Among these firms 50 are relying
exclusively on bank loans and 50 have issued bonds in their capital structure. The time
period for which financial indicators were manually collected is from the 1st of January
2004 until 31st of December 2007 which makes this study one of the most recent in the
field.
Cross-sectional analysis of the gathered data showed that firms with public debt in their
capital structure are more than twice higher leveraged than firms with private debt. The
finding of general bigger size of firms with publicly placed debt is logical and expected
since the total amount of assets is a trustworthy indicator for public investors. However,
the main finding of this paper suggests that firms with public debt are much better
performers than firms with private debt based on the market measure of performance –
Tobin’s q. The difference in the sample firms’ Tobin’s q is more than 28% implying
that the main hypothesis that companies with public debt perform differently than firms
that rely on private debt cannot be rejected and supporting the argument that capital
structure does influence the overall firm performance.
In addition the results also revealed that firms with previous public history outperform
those that initially make public offerings and those who rely on private debt. This
relation  is  also  based  on  the  market  measure  of  performance,  while  another  finding
suggests that firms with initial public debt offerings experiencing higher return on
equity.
Furthermore, concerning the second purpose of this paper stated as the estimation of the
effect of switching from private bank loans to publicly placed debt there was found that
after such substitution firms became much more leveraged and showed sustainable
growth. However, again based on the market measure of performance it is appeared that
these companies experienced decline in the performance. On average the difference in
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Tobin’s q indicator between switched and other companies was about -33%, which
completely supports the second hypothesis made in this paper and totally consistent
with James (1987) who found negative abnormal return for announcements of bank debt
repayment by issuing public debt.
Generalizing obtained evidence it is possible to conclude that different debt sources
influence firm performance differently. In particular there was found that public debt
increases the market measure of performance (Tobin’s q) making those firms that use it
in their capital structure more valuable. The possible interpretation of such behavior
might be in availability of larger capitals on the public market entering which a
company is able to attract bigger amount of debt than from the banks and as the results
has more financial flexibility. In addition better public recognition also influences stock
prices rising market capitalization and as the result market measure of performance. The
finding that firms with continuing public debt offerings perform better supports this
statement.
On the other hand negative relation of bank loans pay downs by issued public bonds and
firm performance can be explained by debt overhanging problem. In other words firms
that substituted their bank loan agreements with publicly traded bonds and used the rest
of proceeds for other purposes become more leveraged and as the result riskier from the
investors point of view. Therefore the market measure of performance significantly
declined on average for those firms.
The present research can be extended in several  ways.  First,  it  would be interesting to
make cross-country analysis of the issue. Comparison of the results from the biggest
world economies would provide additional theoretical framework on the issue of the
capital structure and debt choice. Second, it is possible to broaden the types of debt used
for the analysis. Thus for example distinguishing between private bank debt, public debt
and private non-bank debt would provide more accurate results. Finally, the analysis
made in this work raises the issue of optimal forms of debt reliance. If the tradeoff
between public/private debt and firm performance is clear than one might be interested
how does different mixtures of debt sources affect firm performance?
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